ASCP 2015
CONFERENCE BOOKLET
general information - program - abstracts
GENERAL CONFERENCE INFORMATION
REGISTRATION • TRANSPORT • ACCESSIBILITY • FINDING THE VENUE • FOOD ON CAMPUS • CONFERENCE RECEPTION • FACILITIES ON CAMPUS • THE CONFERENCE DINNER

REGISTRATION

Registration will open at 9 a.m. on Wednesday, in the foyer of the Central Lecture Block (CLB) <http://lostoncampus.com.au/82/map>, and the registration and information desk will be open for the duration of the conference.

TRANSPORT TO UNSW

FROM THE AIRPORT

TAXI

The conference venue is 14km from Sydney International Airport and 7km from Sydney Domestic Airport. It takes approximately 20 - 25 minutes to reach by car. A taxi will cost approximately AUD$40.00 from the International Airport and AUD$25.00 from the Domestic Airport. (http://www.sydneyairport.com.au/go/by-taxi.aspx)

PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Take the train to Central Station or Town Hall Station and then follow any of the City-to-UNSW routes in the table below. Bus Routes 400 and 410 also travel from both the international and the domestic airports to UNSW (much cheaper than airport train, N.B. see ticket info below). Clearly marked bus stops are located on the arrivals level outside each of these terminals. Bus takes about 35 minutes from the Int. airport and 25 from the domestic.

Buying Your Ticket. Most buses are Pre-pay Only, esp. during peak hours (7am-9am and 4pm-6:30pm), so you cannot buy your ticket on board. You may, however, purchase an Opal Card at some train stations, grocery or convenience stores (Woolworths, Coles or 7-Eleven, and most newsagents). Domestic and International Airport train stations sell it too. Aside from Opal, you can also purchase MyBus paper-tickets (MyBus1, 2 or 3). If you choose to buy paper-tickets, we suggest you buy MyBusz TravelTen, which is valid for 10 trips to and from UNSW. For more information on tickets see http://www.transportnsw.info/en/tickets/index.page

FROM THE CITY

Take the M50 bus (Usually a long red bus) either from Town Hall Station (Park St, Stand H) or Central Station (Elizabeth St, Stand E). If you’re coming from the City, High St near Wansey Road (or near Gate 8 UNSW), the second stop on High St (at top of the hill) after the bus turns off Anzac Parade, is the closest bus stop to the conference venues (C-20 Morven Brown).
You may also take any of the buses that pass along Anzac Parade. (See table below). These buses are very frequent from the city. Be aware though that the conference venue is a power 7-minute walk through campus up hill from Anzac Parade.

FROM COOGEE

If you’re coming from Coogee, the closest bus stop to the venue is High St near Gate 9 UNSW. M50 and 370 buses can get you there. Please see the table below for your reference.

FROM CITY AND CENTRAL TO UNSW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bus No.</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Frequency and other info</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M50</td>
<td>Either from: 1) Town Hall Park St, Stand H; or, 2) Central Stn Elizabeth St, Stand E (Stop 201080)</td>
<td>High St near Wansey Rd, Randwick (Stop 2031164) or near Gate 8 UNSW; second stop after turning off Anzac Parade</td>
<td>• Pre-paid ticket only  • runs every 15mins  • travel time: 1) 33 mins or 2) 23mins</td>
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<tr>
<td>891 (express bus to UNSW)</td>
<td>Central Stn Eddy Ave, Stand D (Stop 200054)</td>
<td>High St near Wansey Rd, Randwick (Stop 2031164) or near Gate 8 UNSW; second stop from Anzac Parade 895 drops off on Anzac Pd only</td>
<td>• Pre-paid ticket only  • travel time: 15-20mins  • operates until 11:05am during University break  • These direct express services have reduced frequency in December</td>
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<tr>
<td>895</td>
<td>Central Stn Eddy Ave, Stand D (Stop 200053)</td>
<td>Anzac Pde, Stand D at UNSW, Kensington (Stop 203311) M10 Central-unsw via Oxford St and Anzac Pde.</td>
<td>• M10: pre-paid ticket  • runs every 5mins  • travel time: 20-25mins</td>
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<td>391, 393, 395, M10</td>
<td>City (Elizabeth St, 5 mins from Town Hall), via Oxford St, Darlinghurst</td>
<td>Anzac Pde, Stand D at UNSW, Kensington (Stop 203311)</td>
<td>• Very regular  • Travel time: 15-20mins</td>
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FROM COOGEE TO UNSW

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<tr>
<th>Bus No.</th>
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<th>Frequency and other info</th>
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<tr>
<td>M50, 370</td>
<td>Arden St near Coogee Beach, Coogee (Stop 203471)</td>
<td>High St near Gate 9 UNSW, Randwick (Stop 203115)</td>
<td>• M50: pre-paid ticket  • runs every 10-12mins  • travel time: 11-13mins</td>
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</table>

For more specific travel information, check [www.transportnsw.info](http://www.transportnsw.info).
This provides an online route planner for all public transport in Sydney.

**TAXIS** can also easily be hailed on High Street, or call:
- Taxis Combined - 13 33 00
- Legion Cabs - 13 14 51
- Premier Cabs - 13 10 17

**If you are driving**, some casual day parking spaces are available on the top floors of the Barker Street (Gate 14) and Botany Street (Gate 11) car parks. Sometimes this parking may not be available due to various other demands. *Please take note of the signage and ensure that you park in a casual parking space, as UNSW parking is rigorously monitored.* See: [http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/getting-uni/driving-parking/parking-rates](http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/getting-uni/driving-parking/parking-rates)

Off-campus parking may be available in Randwick (for instance, on Wansey Rd).

There are also four **Go Get** bays on campus: [https://www.goget.com.au/find-cars/](https://www.goget.com.au/find-cars/).

**ACCESSIBILITY**

Accessible parking and toilets on campus are indicated on this map: [http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/sites/all/files/KENC Accessible Parking %26 Toilets.pdf](http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/sites/all/files/KENC Accessible Parking %26 Toilets.pdf)

**FINDING THE VENUE**

The conference will be held in upper campus, in the Central Lecture Block (CLB, map reference E19), Morven Brown Building (C20), and John Goodsell Building (F20), all adjacent to one another around the Commerce Courtyard.

The campus map can be found at the following link. The closest entrance to these venues is Gate 9. [http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/sites/all/files/page_file_attachment/KENC - Campus Map 3.pdf](http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/sites/all/files/page_file_attachment/KENC - Campus Map 3.pdf)
GETTING SOMETHING TO EAT

There is a range of eateries on campus for lunch. While the conference will be located at “upper campus,” close to Southern Wok in the Morven Brown building, the library lawn coffee cart, and the Matthews Building Food court, mid- and lower- campus are also close by, about a ten-minute walk to the Village in lower campus. You can fine a range of places to eat, as well as ATM locations, on this page: http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/food-retail/food-and-retail-campus

CONFERENCE RECEPTION

On the first evening of the conference the ASCP reception and welcome to delegates will take place in the in the CLB foyer. The special issue of Parrhesia from last year’s conference will also be launched at the reception.

FACILITIES ON CAMPUS

BANKS
Commonwealth Bank: Upper campus, near the Post Office: branch and ATMs; Morven Brown Building, near Commerce Courtyard: ATM; Lower campus, Blockhouse: ATM

ANZ Bank: Middle Campus, Quadrangle Building, Lower Ground floor (next to the Bookshop): cashless branch and ATM; Lower Campus, Blockhouse: ATM

DOCTORS
UNSW Health Service
Ground Floor of the Quadrangle Building
Opening hours: Monday to Friday: 9.00am to 5.00pm
Tel: (02) 9385 5425

PHARMACY
UNSW Pharmacy
Shop G039 Quadrangle Building Map Reference E15
Tel: (02) 9385 7617
**GROCERIES**
There is an IGA on campus, near the terraces on High Street, lower campus.

**POST OFFICE**
UNSW Post Office
At the back of the Library, behind the Commonwealth Bank
There are Australia Post Offices located on Anzac Parade Kensington, at the Spot in Randwick (50 Perouse Road) and upstairs in the Royal Randwick Shopping Centre on Belmore Road

**BARS**
UNSW’s Kensington campus has a number of drinking holes: *The Roundhouse* and *Coco Cubano*, lower campus; and *The Whitehouse*, mid campus (see: [http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/food-retail/food-and-retail-campus](http://www.facilities.unsw.edu.au/food-retail/food-and-retail-campus)).

There are also some other local possibilities, including:

*SumBar (Wine bar + Tapas)*
50 Frenchmans Road
Randwick NSW 2031
02 9399 6669

*Royal Hotel Randwick*
2 Perouse Road
Randwick NSW 2031
(02) 9399 3006
[www.royalhotel-sydney.com](http://www.royalhotel-sydney.com)

*Doncaster Hotel Bistro*
268 Anzac Pde
Kensington NSW 2033
02 9313 6333
[www.doncasterhotel.net.au](http://www.doncasterhotel.net.au)
CONFERENCE DINNER

The conference dinner will be on the second evening (Thursday, December 3, at 7 p.m.). This year we are “deconstructing” the conference dinner by allowing delegates to choose between a number of recommended restaurants that cater for different needs and preferences (cuisines, price, dietary preferences, and location). We will then all meet up at around 9 p.m. at the Doncaster Hotel, http://doncasterhotel.net.au/ on Anzac Parade for an after-dinner drink.

Please note that we have not collected money for the dinner this year, and so it is delegates’ responsibility to ensure they pay their chosen restaurant for the meal afterwards.

Lists will be available at the registration desk to indicate your preference, but if these are full, still feel free to contact the venues and ask if they have a table.

RECOMMENDED RESTAURANTS

- Sushi Tengoku, 121 Anzac Parade. Excellent, reasonably priced sushi. BYO.
- Pondok Buyung, 140 Anzac Parade, cheap but authentic and delicious Indonesian food, BYO
- Chairman Mao, 189 Anzac Parade. Excellent Hunan food, with license
- Mamak Village, University Terraces, B8 on campus map. Malaysian cuisine, cheap but good for the price.

Map 1: Recommended restaurants (with UNSW campus in bottom right corner)
OTHER OPTIONS A BIT FURTHER AWAY

- The Cookhouse, 141 Belmore Road, Randwick. Pub and bistro favourites. Licensed, craft beer and boutique wines.
- Moroccan Feast, 127 Avoca St, Randwick. Good traditional Moroccan. BYO.
- Lebanon and Beyond, 187 Alison Rd, Randwick. Good Lebanese. BYO.

Map 2: Restaurants (with UNSW campus in bottom left corner)

GATHERING AT THE DONCASTER HOTEL

We propose an after dinner gathering at the Doncaster Hotel, 268 Anzac Parade (the terrace upstairs) at 9 p.m. The Doncaster is very close to our recommended restaurants on Anzac Parade and a 25 min walk from the options further away.
### WEDNESDAY

#### Registration
Central Lecture Block (CLB) Foyer

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Social Philosophy Stream</th>
<th>Film-Philosophy Stream</th>
<th>Goodsell G3</th>
<th>Goodsell G4</th>
<th>Goodsell G6</th>
<th>Goodsell LG 19</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00-9:30</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
<td>Morven Brown 310</td>
<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>The Perdurance of</td>
<td>Meillassoux and</td>
<td>Redeeming Richard</td>
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<td>9:30-11:00</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G4</td>
<td>Perspectives on Post-</td>
<td>Meillassoux, Brassier,</td>
<td>the Condition of</td>
<td>Rorty: Self-Creation and Solidarity as</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>Traumatic Memory</td>
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<td>Correlation</td>
<td>Strategies for Self-Enlargement</td>
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<td>Culture: Memoria</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>(Michaela Baker)</td>
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<td>11:15-11:30</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
<td>Morven Brown 310</td>
<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
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<td>In/coherent Foucault:</td>
<td>Meillassoux and the</td>
<td>Sensing the</td>
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<td>The Debate between the</td>
<td>Condition of Correlation</td>
<td>Interrelationality of</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>Temporality and</td>
<td>Coherence and Non-</td>
<td>(Rajat Acharya)</td>
<td>legein and logos: The</td>
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<td>11:30-12:30</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>(Rosalyn Diprose)</td>
<td>(Wendyl Luna)</td>
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<td>Intersubjective Ethics</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>On Thinking:</td>
<td>Foucault On the Archive</td>
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<td>in Education (Patricia</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>After Arendt and</td>
<td>(Adina Arvatu)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>Ryle (Max</td>
<td>Human Rights and the</td>
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<td>(Alex Lefebvre)</td>
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<td>Autonomy and Freedom in The Stanley Parable (Liam Miller)</td>
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<td>Vision Restoration (Tommy Cleary)</td>
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**Panel:** Can there be Law without Violence?
(Peg Birmingham, James Martel, Dimitris Vardoulakis)

- Mise en Abyme and Affirmation in Blanchot’s Mechanism of Worklessness (Iddo Dickmann)
- A Community of the Homeless (Terrilyn Sweep)
- Death, Dying and the Unliving (Michaela Baker)
- Φύσις on Film? Heidegger, Art, and the Question of the Cinematic Manifestation of Being (Michael Moseley)

**Morning Tea**
(Central Lecture Block Courtyard)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Session Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>12:50-1:50</td>
<td>lunch</td>
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</table>
| 1:55-3:25     | Goodsell 221-223 | The Kantian Trial Separation in German Aesthetics’ Marriage of Truth and Beauty (James Phillips)  
Can Love Be Excessive? Baumgarten and Kant on the Relationship Between Love and Respect (Toshiro Osawa)  
Kant and the Form of Community (Max Sipowicz) |
|               | Morven Brown 310 | Vision and its Double (Caterina Di Fazio)  
Sátántangó: Merleau-Ponty and the Motion-Picture (Mark Cutler)  
How Reality Television Displaces Creativity (Carla Rocavert) |
|               | Morven Brown G3 | Towards a Genealogy of Normativity (Mark Kelly)  
Freedom and Modern Subjectivity: Recasting a Notion of Radical Freedom (Ricardo Jose Gutierrez) |
|               | Morven Brown G4 | Equity and Diversity Session (Marguerite La Caze and Ross Barham convening) |
|               | Morven Brown G6 | Heidegger’s Captivating Use of Language (Andrew Inkpin) |
|               | Goodsell LG 19 | BOOK PANEL: Jon Roffe, *Abstract Market Theory*  
(Miguel Vatter, Henry Somers-Hall, Joe Hughes, Gregory Flaxman) |
| 3:25-3:40     | afternoon tea | Afternoon Tea  
(Central Lecture Block Courtyard) |
| 3:45-5:15     |              | KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DENNIS SCHMIDT  
Where Ethics Begins …  
(Central Lecture Block, Theatre 6) |
| 5:30-7:30     |              | ASCP Conference Reception:  
(Central Lecture Block Foyer) |
**PLENARY: Max Deutscher Panel**  
(Central Lecture Block, Theatre 6)  
Paul Crittenden, Michelle Boulous-Walker and Max Deutscher

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<tr>
<td><strong>THURSDAY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Morning Tea</strong></td>
<td><strong>A Madman, and Black Man and a Jewish Woman Go to a Conference… But the ‘King Stay the King’ (Bryan Mukandi)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
<td><strong>Communal Atonement and Impossible Ethical Demands (Marguerite La Caze)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>9:15-10:30</strong></td>
<td>(Central Lecture Block Courtyard)</td>
<td>Being-Object/Subject: Casting Anew the Ontological Violence of Racism (Helen Ngo)</td>
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<td><strong>The Struggle for Recognition in the Theatre of Politics (Matheson Russell)</strong></td>
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<td>A Madman, and Black Man: Walter Benjamin on Violence and Ethical Anarchism (Dimitri Vouro)</td>
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<td><strong>Arendt on the Active Life (Nicholas Smith)</strong></td>
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<td>Beyond Herself: Feminist (Auto)portraiture and the Moving Image (Nadine Boljivoc)</td>
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<td><strong>Le Dœuff’s Habits of Reading: Philosophy as a Way of Life (Michelle Boulous-Walker)</strong></td>
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<td>“What’s this War in the Heart of Nature?” Now-Time and the Figural in Terrence Malick’s film The Thin Red Line (1998) (Gabriella Blasi)</td>
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<td><strong>The image between power and authority (Robyn Adler)</strong></td>
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<td>The Contemporary Imaginary and False Continuities of Ryan Trecartin (Denise Thwaites)</td>
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<td><strong>The image between power and authority (Robyn Adler)</strong></td>
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<td>Le Dœuff’s Habits of Reading: Philosophy as a Way of Life (Michelle Boulous-Walker)</td>
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<td><strong>The Struggle for Recognition in the Theatre of Politics (Matheson Russell)</strong></td>
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<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
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<td>Arendt on the Active Life (Nicholas Smith)</td>
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<td><strong>Le Dœuff’s Habits of Reading: Philosophy as a Way of Life (Michelle Boulous-Walker)</strong></td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
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<td><strong>Thinking Through Moral Distress with Simone de Beauvoir (Christinia Landry)</strong></td>
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<td>Goodsell LG 19</td>
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<td>BOOK PANEL: Jennifer Mensch, Kant’s Organicism (Michael Olson, Dalia Nassar, Diego Bubbio,)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown 209</td>
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<td>Chair: Dimitris Vardoulakis</td>
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<td>10:50-12:20</td>
<td><strong>A Madman, and Black Man and a Jewish Woman Go to a Conference… But the ‘King Stay the King’ (Bryan Mukandi)</strong></td>
<td><strong>A Madman, and Black Man and a Jewish Woman Go to a Conference… But the ‘King Stay the King’ (Bryan Mukandi)</strong></td>
<td><strong>A Madman, and Black Man and a Jewish Woman Go to a Conference… But the ‘King Stay the King’ (Bryan Mukandi)</strong></td>
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<td>2:55-3:10</td>
<td>Afternoon Tea (Central Lecture Block Courtyard)</td>
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<td>3:15-4:45</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
<td>The Concept of Life in Helmut Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology (Marc de Leeuw)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown 310</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
<td>Conceptualizing a More Robust Conception of Emancipation (William Hebblewhite)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G4</td>
<td>Elements for an Ontology of Action (Oliver Feltham)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
<td>Postgraduate and ECR development session</td>
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<td>4:50-6:20</td>
<td>KEYNOTE ADDRESS: ALISON ROSS</td>
<td>What Is An Image?</td>
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<td>8:30-11:00pm</td>
<td>Informal Conference Drinks from 8:30pm</td>
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<td>9:00-10:30</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
<td><strong>Modernism and Philosophy Stream</strong></td>
<td>Walter Benjamin's Ontology Of Art (Alexei Procyshyn)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown 310</td>
<td><strong>Psychoanalysis and Philosophy Stream</strong></td>
<td>PANEL: Making a Scene (Justin Clemens, Joseph Hughes, Gregory Flaxman)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
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<td>Communicability and Common Sense: Feminist Appropriations of Arendt’s Work on Judgement (Sarah Lucas)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G4</td>
<td><strong>PANEL: The Problem of History</strong></td>
<td>The Limits of Contextual Determination (Michael Olson)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
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<td>Deleuze’s concept of intensity in context: thermodynamics and transcendental philosophy (Dale Clisby)</td>
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<td>Goodsell LG 19</td>
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<td>Revisiting the relation of expression in Difference and Repetition (Sean Bowden)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown 209</td>
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<td>Dasein and Cognition (Marilyn Stendera)</td>
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<td>Critical analysis of the philosophical conception of verification of being/the self in Heidegger's Being and Time against dao/the other in Laozi's Daodejing (Lucian Green)</td>
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<td>Heidegger between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics (Ingo Farin)</td>
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<td>10:30-10:45</td>
<td>Central Lecture Block Courtyard</td>
<td><strong>Morning Tea</strong></td>
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<td>10:50-12:20</td>
<td>Central Lecture Block, Theatre 7</td>
<td><strong>KEYNOTE ADDRESS: AMY ALLEN</strong></td>
<td>Progress and the Death Drive</td>
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<td>12:20-1:40</td>
<td>Central Lecture Block, Theatre 6</td>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
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<td>Central Lecture Block, Theatre 6</td>
<td><strong>ASCP Annual General Meeting</strong></td>
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<td>1:40-3:10</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
<td><strong>BOOK PANEL: Foucault and the Politics of Rights</strong> (Daniel McLoughlin, Jessica Whyte, Paul Patton, Colin Koopman)</td>
<td>Wild Psychoanalysis: Feral Philosophy (Robyn Ferrell)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown 310</td>
<td><strong>BOOK PANEL: Ben Golder</strong></td>
<td>The Reality of Religion in Hegel’s Idealist Metaphysics (Diego Bubbio)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
<td><strong>BOOK PANEL: Deleuze’s Bartleby</strong></td>
<td>Feminist Theory after Bergson: Determination and Indetermination in the Tendencies of Sexual Difference (Rebecca Hill)</td>
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<td>Morven Brown G6</td>
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<td>Violence and Relational Existence: Its Significance for Our Experience of Confidence, Self-trust and Distrust (Fiona Utley)</td>
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**PANEL:** A discussion or presentation involving multiple presenters or experts.

**BOOK PANEL:** A panel specifically devoted to a book's discussion or analysis.

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS:** A special address given by a distinguished speaker, often on a significant topic.

**Lunch:** A meal break provided during the conference.

**ASCP Annual General Meeting:** An annual meeting of the ASCP (American Society for Continental Philosophy).

**Morning Tea:** A light refreshment offered during the conference.

**Panelists:** Experts or practitioners who present their views, research, or work in a specific field.

**Courtyard:** An outdoor area within a conference venue where attendees can relax or have light refreshments.

**Central Lecture Block:** A main lecture hall or auditorium within the conference venue.
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Venue/Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mallarmé the Mathematician?</td>
<td>Christian Gelder</td>
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<td>Two Ways to Distinguish between Subject and Ego: Sartre and Lacan</td>
<td>Robert Boncardo</td>
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<td>Philosophy’s (Non-) Sexual Rapports</td>
<td>Peter Banki</td>
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<td>The Tribulations of the Unhappy Consciousness</td>
<td>Joshua O’Rourke</td>
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<td>Surfing Like a Girl</td>
<td>Daniel Brennan</td>
<td>Goodsell LG 19</td>
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<td>A Maximal Forgiveness-Based Account of Reconciliatory Justice: The Rwandan Genocide and Ethical Restoration</td>
<td>Elese Dowden</td>
<td>Morven Brown 209</td>
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**Time Table**

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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>3:10-3:25</td>
<td>Afternoon Tea</td>
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<td>3:30-5:00</td>
<td>Epistemic remarks on Duchamp’s readymades (Alessio Tacca)</td>
<td>Goodsell 221-223</td>
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<td>The Shlock of the New: Badiou, Duchamp, and the Everyday Miracle (Alex Ling)</td>
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<td>The Gay Science and the Rosarium Philosophorum (Matthew Gildersleeve)</td>
<td>Morven Brown G3</td>
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<td>BODY SNITCHERS: Torture, Psychoanalysis and the Cinematic Body (Lauren Bliss)</td>
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<td>Four Readings of Nietzsche as a Biopolitical Thinker (Vanessa Lemm)</td>
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<td>Reassessing Nietzsche’s Politics (Paul Patton)</td>
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<td>The Death of God and the Birth of the Immoralist (Daniel Conway)</td>
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<td>PANEL: Contemporary Nietzsche</td>
<td>BOOK PANEL: Matthew Sharpe, Camus Philosophe: To Return to Our Beginnings</td>
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<td>Four Readings of Nietzsche as a Biopolitical Thinker (Vanessa Lemm)</td>
<td>(Marguerite La Caze, Daniel Brennan, Jean-Philippe Deranty)</td>
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<td>PANEL: The Ethics and Politics of Non-Human Relations</td>
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<td>Pre- and Post- Human Animal(s): The Limits and Possibilities of Human-Animal Relations (Nicole Anderson)</td>
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<td>Listing Towards Cosmoscacy: Whitman, Derrida, and the Non-Human Turn (Christopher Peterson)</td>
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**Colour Key for Streams**

- Biopolitics
- Cinema and Philosophy
- Environmental Philosophy
- Modernism and Philosophy
- Psychoanalysis and Philosophy
- Social Philosophy
KEYNOTES

Progress and the Death Drive
AMY ALLEN

Although the early Frankfurt School was deeply engaged with psychoanalysis, second and third generation critical theorists working in this tradition have either turned away from psychoanalysis altogether (Habermas) or adopted a sanitized version of psychoanalysis that has been stripped of the notion of the death drive (Honneth). In this paper, I suggest that one of the reasons for this turn is the assumption that the death drive is incompatible with the possibility of historical progress, a concept that Habermas and Honneth take to be essential to the project of critical theory. Through a critical re-reading of Marcuse, Freud, Klein, and Adorno, I argue that the death drive need not be incompatible with all understandings of progress, though it does place limits on how we understand this concept. I read the late Freud and Klein as offering a tragic, unreconciled vision of history that is nonetheless compatible with a minimal, negativistic, Adornian conception of progress as the avoidance of catastrophe.

Amy Allen is Professor and Head of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University. She is also editor of the Columbia University Press series New Directions in Critical Theory and Co-Editor in Chief of the journal Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory. Her publications include The Politics of Our SELVES: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008; paperback edition, 2013) and The End of Progress: De-colonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, which will be published later this year by Columbia University Press.

What is an image?
ALISON ROSS

The category of the image is generally understood in terms that emphasise its connection with visual perception. And yet, even in those intellectual traditions that make this connection all important, it is clear that an image cannot adequately be defined as a perceptible visual form. This paper will argue that the question ‘what is an image?’ is entangled with another: that of the ‘significance’ or ‘meaning’ of the image. The image presupposes a subject who is engaged by it. Further, through the image human beings step outside their ordinary experience and even rework that
experience. In this regard, the meaning communicated in an image provides sensible intuition for ideas that would not otherwise have existential resonance.


**Where ethics begins ...**

**DENNIS SCHMIDT**

The intention of this paper is to further develop my current project of formulating the possibility of an ethical sensibility that does not rest upon grounds that one might call metaphysical, theological, humanistic, or upon foundations understood in any orthodox manner. The larger project within which this paper sits has addressed the topic of ethical sense as a matter of practices and so I have chapters in which the ethical import of various practices—reading, gardening, music, aesthetic experience, writing—are considered in a number of different philosophical and literary texts—from Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Adorno, Heidegger, and Foucault. This paper continues that project by looking carefully at some remarks that Derrida makes in *The Beast and Sovereign* (vol. 2) about corpses, burial, and memory.

The most basic argument of the paper is that these themes—and especially the way in which Derrida opens them up—point to, as he puts it, “the place where ethics begins”.

**Dennis Schmidt** is Professor of Philosophy at Western Sydney University. He is the author of *Between Word and Image Heidegger, Klee, and Gadamer on Gesture and Genesis* (Indiana UP, 2013) and *Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the Word, Freedom, and History* (SUNY, 2005), among other books.
‘The Deep Need for Convention’: Beholding and Judgment in Michael Fried’s Modernism
MATHEW ABBOTT

Michael Fried’s 1967 polemic “Art and Objecthood” intervened decisively into then-emerging discussions of minimalism. Responding to Donald Judd’s 1964 piece “Specific Objects,” Fried’s essay provides a persuasive account of the minimalist project: overcoming the pictorialism, relationality, and anthropomorphism inherent in painting by projecting its disavowed physical essence. While recognising the force of Judd’s argument (and the effectiveness of his works), Fried’s rejoinder was powerful: Judd had failed to grasp the conventional nature of artistic media, and so was responding with confused aggression to a problem he understood poorly.

Though his critics associate him with Greenbergian formalism, Fried’s argument here is better understood as Wittgensteinian. On this account, the essence of a medium is mutable and historical: it is worked out piece by piece, discovered on the ground. That the right word for this is ‘discovered’ and not, say, ‘invented’ is crucial to a Wittgensteinian sensibility, convention is not something we arbitrarily create or construct; it is precisely not ‘mere’ convention. Though it is not committed to the Platonic idea that media have timeless physical essences, in other words, this is also not a social constructionist account of medium, at least if that is taken to mean that media somehow lack essences, defined as internal forces, limits, or conditions determining what will suffice at a given time.

Drawing on John McDowell and Alice Crary, I bring out the Wittgensteinian elements of Fried’s argument. I then place it in the context of his later art history, working to demonstrate how his discoveries in this field both consolidate and complicate the claims of his early critical polemic. I conclude with an account of why Fried’s modernism is so confounding to contemporary critics and analytic aestheticians.

Meillassoux and the Condition of Correlation
RAJAT ACHARYA

Quentin Meillassoux’s most important publication to date is his 2006 book Après la finitude: Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence, which harbours several very novel yet very controversial theses, the most important of which is arguably that of ‘correlationism’, a neologism coined to signify the diagnosis of a condition that has crippled the philosophical tradition at least since its ‘critical turn’ in the 1780s. This condition is the doxa that every ego is confined to the inevitable co-relation between subjective epistemological meaning (i.e. ideality) and objective ontological being
(i.e. reality), unable to properly adopt either the one or the other. Thus, for Meillassoux, correlationism is neither a realism nor an idealism, but a repugnant compromise that cuts between such diametrically oppositional binary terms, as a finitudinal repression which condemns the ego to an abyssal netherworld that is neither here nor there. Such netherworldliness is the ego’s vacuous cognition of the in-itself, albeit merely always already for-itself. This paper is meant to be a critical reconstruction of Meillassoux’s thesis of the origination and refutation of such correlationism, via discussion of: (i) Immanuel Kant’s 1781/1789 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (implicated in *Après la finitude*); (ii) Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1794 *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (explicated in Meillassoux’s 2007 discussion in ‘Speculative Realism’ and implicated in his 2008 lecture ‘Time without Becoming’); (iii) David Hume’s 1738 *Treatise of Human Nature* (implicated in Meillassoux’s 2012 ‘Berlin Lecture’); and, (iv) George Berkeley’s 1710 *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (implicated in that same ‘Berlin Lecture’). Yet, this paper is also meant as a reconstructive critique of this attempted refutation and supposed origination. Indeed, it suggests that correlationism is not an egoic repression of netherworldly cognition, but a universal condition of possibility for the egoic liberation of properly mundane cogitation.

The image between power and authority  
ROBYN ADLER

This paper sketches the relation between the image and equality in the work of Marie José Mondzain through an investigation of authority as the ground of symbolic and imaginary construction. Via a philological exploration of *exousia*, as an excess of being linked to its Latin synonym *auctoritas*, Mondzain demonstrates that authority is at the heart of all thinking about the inaugural power of a subject who achieves their constituent desire for recognition by sharing equally in constitutive fictions in the presence of others. The church fathers’ construction of the economy of the image, conceived as incarnation and articulated in the triumph of the image during the iconoclastic crisis, monopolised power in the visible and the authoritative legitimacy of the invisible, capturing the liberating potential of *exousia*. St Paul’s rhetorical finesse extended this regime to the economic temporalization of the invisible authority by tying it to the payment of taxes, hinging an excess of grace to perpetual debt and ensuring equality become contingent upon the subordination to a hierarchy. This trajectory continues in the face of the violence of the spectacle which suspends the action of the dominated in an endless stream of audiovisual promises of continual *jouissance* that deny alterity and where the primary visibility of power is money. Unhooked from the agencies of credit, the provenance of authority rests on mutual recognition constructed through the sharing of gazes
between author and spectator whereby the spectator becomes an active subject of thought and speech in a political arena for temporal exchange, gifted with resistance and the power of invention. Any philosophical investigation of power cannot afford to dismiss an examination of the image and given what is at stake in the erasure of visibilities, the art of creation is surely a political matter.

**Relations, Differentials and the Nonhuman in Concepts of Community**

**PAUL ALBERTS**

Philosophical examination of the concept of community has been particularly intense as part of projects analyzing traditional suppositions about the nature of the human social bond, our being-together, and the grounds of political actions and relations. In answering the crucial question of ‘What is human community’, particular argumentative directions for political philosophy are opened for development, and the inferences lead to particular political valences. Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito, amongst others, have offered important interrogations of the way in which we have traditionally answered this question, and, then offered critical alternative conceptualizations, in order to deflate hypostasized or essentialized ‘community’ — and the limited or regressive political ordering that is conceived at the same time. This paper briefly examines some of their most important claims, in order to attempt to develop a concept of community in new directions. To open ‘community’ beyond its traditional configurations offers possibilities to think new expanded social dynamics beyond the exclusivity granted to human subjects’ participation — a project that is emerging in the early twenty-first century as an important part of critical environmental philosophy. If nonhuman beings have trajectories with human subjects and through human societies across time, while being positioned in various relations, and participating in what can be called ‘differentials’ for sustaining life, then the nonhuman in community reconfigures how to rewrite an effective political philosophy.

**Foucault On the Archive**

**ADINA ARVATU**

In this paper, I offer a brief and novel presentation of the most salient philosophical features of Foucault’s ‘archive,’ as it emerges in his early — archaeological — writings. On my reconstruction, the archive (singular) is a critical transformation of Kantian boundary conceptuality from a tool for the necessary (architectonic) integration of natural scientific orders, into a paradoxical logic of interdisciplinarity that accounts for the genesis of humanities as localized, tactical interventions in a general field of knowledge. It is thus fair to say that, before it breaks into a ‘fever,’ notably with Derrida’s *Mal d’archive* (1994, 1995) / *Archive Fever* (1996) and the hugely popular
‘archival turn’ in the humanities, the archive starts as a hangover from the encyclopaedic projects of German Idealism (Hegel especially).

On this re-description, it becomes apparent that between the archive as a product of methodological imagination, and what we usually refer to—in the plural—as the archives, viz. an institution of social memory, there is no direct and obvious passage. Some translation is always required. I shall conclude by offering a brief outline of Foucault’s own attempt to bridge the two in his archival practice, using the Pierre Rivière dossier (1973; 1975) as a case study.

Death, dying and the unliving
MICHAELA BAKER

‘The living,’ states Nietzsche, ‘is merely a type of what is dead’ (Gay Science, §109). In this paper, I analyse this statement, and examine how it might be interpreted through the lens of Sartre’s discussions of ‘My past’ and ‘My death’ in Part IV, Chapter 1 of Being and Nothingness. I suggest two ways in which Nietzsche’s contention might be interpreted: what I term an ontological reading, and a phenomenological reading. In order to elucidate the second of these, I discuss the interplay between the living, the dead, and a third category, which I term the ‘unliving’, in the World War I poetry of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon. I draw on Harrison’s contention that the very temporality of the flow of conscious experience renders it an experience of mortality (2003, p. 3) and examine how the fact that poetry’s ‘rhythms participate in, arise out of, or echo [this] flow’ (Harrison, 2003, p. 3) makes it an ideal medium for the examination of death. Secondly, I examine the ways in which these poets portray death, the process of dying, and the relationship between the living and the dead. This relationship is both personal and collective—the dead of the war remain ‘indwelling’ (Harrison, 2003, p. x), both with the poets who wrote about them, and in our collective memories. Finally, I discuss the ways in which the traumas of dealing daily with death on such a scale and in such proximity render many who fought in the War what I term ‘unliving’.

Philosophy’s (Non-)Sexual Rapports
PETER BANKI

This paper reads Jacques Lacan’s provocative thesis in *L’Étourdit* that “il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel”. Lacan explicitly plays on the double meaning in French of the French word rapport, so the sentence can and in fact should translated as both “there is no sexual relation” and “there is no sexual rapport.” Lacan does not wish to suggest that sex does not happen, but that it does not happen in the way that we normally think. By referring to the interpretations of Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou, the paper will attempt to show how a careful reading of Lacan’s thesis can be used to critique much of the literature in the growing fields of adult sex education and porn studies. The paper will also examine the consequences of Lacan’s thesis for any inquiry into the “relation” (avowed or disavowed) between philosophy and sex.

Against the Rhetorics of Incapacity: education as true change
ADAM BARTLETT

The proclamations on the end of metaphysics rule out certain forms of the question, Plato’s ‘what is x?’ question being one.

In contemporary discourses on education which operate under the influence of this end, the impossibility of this question sees education go unthought. Discourse operates only on its assumption. As such, current debates about educational change, predicated on notions of disruption or revolution, merely work to further reiterate the impossibility of putting it into question such that it remains a matter of utility, amenable to technique. This paper argues for it being again put into question in order to show that this is not it.

GABRIELLA BLASI

DN Rodowick suggests that cinema primed the advent of time-based spatial media, triggering a new set of ethical questions related to images of time rather than images of space in films. While Gilles Deleuze remains a leading figure in film-philosophical discourse dealing with issues of time and duration, Walter Benjamin’s contribution to the field is less explored. This paper focuses on Terrence Malick’s film *The Thin Red Line* and explores the question of how Malick’s use of cinema alters romantic and nihilistic visions of nature. As will be discussed, a figural approach to film analysis implies the recognition of a non-teleological visibility of recurrent gestures in films. In adopting a figural approach to film analysis, *The Thin Red Line*’s characters enact precise philosophical visions of the nature—culture relation: the Classic heroic ethos of Lt. Col. Gordon Tall (Nick Nolte), the Christian ethos of
Captain Staros (Elias Coteas), the dialectical/Hegelian relation to history and nature of Private Witt (Jim Caviziel) and the Nietzschean/nihilistic approach of Sgt. Edward Welsh (Sean Penn). It will be argued that Malick’s film presents a philosophical gap between romantic and nihilistic visions of nature that the film’s oblique gaze (or subject-less seeing) begins to undo. Through an application of Walter Benjamin’s ideas on film-technologies and Peter Fenves’ account of Benjamin’s conception of time it will be concluded that Malick’s specific use of the cinematic medium articulates a novel philosophical stance to images of time, rather than space, in films. Benjamin’s philosophy provides the theoretical framework to discuss Terrence Malick’s use of the film medium for its inherent and unique relation to time. In this view, film experiences can alter and reconfigure current conditions of apperception of time and space through a highly productive use of the apparatus in the present age.

A failure of imagination? Ernst Bloch, Marxism and utopia.
DAVID BLENCOWE

Marx and Engels did not consider their project to be opposed to utopian socialism, rather that their scientific insights had superseded it.

Founded on a process philosophy that grasps society by its roots, Marx and Engels posited a doctrine where Communism did not have to be imagined in advance in order for it to be achieved. Rather, Communism was to be the eventual result of the revelation of Capitalism’s secret, which is the exploitation of labour. In revolution the proletariat would seize itself as the subject-object of history and inaugurate a new age. Crucially, Communism is not something that has to be established and imposed upon social reality, but is the potential of a historical process that is made possible under Capitalism.

In the twentieth century Ernst Bloch wanted to reinvigorate Marxism with the spirit of utopia. However, he proved equally reluctant to affirm any positive representations of Communism. Utopia for him was a universal impulse, a desire to be free from want and to reconcile with the non-human, natural world. It is to be found in the imagination and in cultural production generally, and not merely in representations that directly portray the perfect society.

Put baldly, each instance of cultural production functions as an image. Bloch drew on the aesthetic heritage of German Idealism and its conception of the symbol in putting forward this, his central idea. The content of each work exceeds the limitations of its form, anticipating an adequate embodiment to come. A work’s truth-content is its subjectivity, and, evoking Hegel, Bloch’s is a utopia of identity. My paper will contextualise Bloch’s attempt to imbue Marxism with utopian images, but it will also evaluate its limitations: by observing the ban on positive
representations of Communism, was Bloch continuing a tradition that fails in its imagination?

**Beyond Herself: Feminist (Auto)Portraiture and the Moving Image**  
**NADINE BOLJKOVAC**

This talk, that assumes its title from my forthcoming *BEYOND HERSELF: Feminist (Auto)Portraiture and the Moving Image*, focuses on questions of biography and autobiography, self-creation and re-creation as it investigates instances of women’s (self-)portraiture and perception via the moving image. With a focus on ‘auto perception,’ a concept that I put forward in *UNTIMELY AFFECTS: Gilles Deleuze and an Ethics of Cinema* in relation to Chris Marker’s oeuvre, this presentation examines a woman’s perception and dissolution as foregrounded by Emmanuelle Riva, and as witnessed and precipitated through the ‘auto’ or self portrait in Alain Resnais’s 1959 *Hiroshima mon amour* and Michael Haneke’s 2012 *Amour*. A network of transnational film, philosophy and disability studies perspectives inform my reading of the films’ folding of gazes between viewer, subjects, filmmakers. These doubling relations witness a process of simultaneous identity and separation as the perception of an Other becomes also a perception of one’s self and self fracturing. Consciousnesses of various reflective screens and surfaces become important—mirrors, eyes of all the worlds a subjectivity confronts—as they produce not only a woman’s awareness of self as a moment of identification and separation but also a consciousness of the moment of things that materializes as a unique experience of time and duration. Scholars have begun to assess the self-portrait in film. This talk intercedes, however, not to celebrate a more intimate and knowing relation with any subject but to discern how the ‘moving’ (self-)portrait might proffer women artists a means for shattering any pure and stable construction of identity.

**Two Ways to Distinguish between Subject and Ego: Sartre and Lacan**  
**ROBERTO BONCARDO**

Following a suggestion from Jacques-Alain Miller, the French Lacanian psychoanalyst Clotilde Leguil has recently explored the way Lacan, in his polemical confrontation with Ego psychology, both drew on and displaced arguments that Sartre, in his ground-breaking article of 1936, ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, had advanced with respect to the distinction between subject and ego. Focusing on the question of the constitution of ego, this paper will explore the way Lacan—the anti-philosopher of the unconscious—creatively re-appropriated resources from Sartre—the philosopher of consciousness—to explain how the ego is at once distinct from, constituted by and yet presents itself fetishistically as primary with respect to the subject. This paper will also clarify and underscore the irreconcilable distinctions
between Lacan and Sartre on the question of the ego, demonstrating thereby that there is more than one way to split the subject.

**Le Dœuff’s Habits of Reading: Philosophy as a Way of Life**  
**MICHELLE BOULOUS-WALKER**

I outline two very different aspects of philosophical work: the “instituting” moments of a love of wisdom and philosophy as a way of life, and the “instituted” structure of a desire to know. These tendencies come together in complex ways to form the “institution” of philosophy. I argue that the guiding principle—the love of wisdom—is responsible for instituting an orientation toward philosophy as transformative, propelling the philosopher from one existential state to another. I focus on what I refer to as Michèle Le Dœuff’s ‘habits’ of reading, arguing that her approach to philosophy as ‘work’—and her belief that this involves shifting thinking from one stage to another—is a useful way of thinking about the transformation that propels the philosopher from one existential state to another. I conclude that Le Dœuff’s work brings us back to the instituting moments of a love of wisdom and philosophy as a way of life, offering us sites of resistance to the institutional approach to reading that threatens real thought.

**Revisiting the relation of expression in Difference and Repetition**  
**SEAN BOWDEN**

In the space of two paragraphs in the fifth chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze makes two claims that initially appear in tension with one another. The first is that intensity determines the differential relations of the Idea to be differenciated or actualised (p.245). The second is that intensity is independent of differenciation by virtue of its own essential process (p.246). In subsequent pages, Deleuze explains that it is by virtue of a relation of ‘expression’ that holds between intensities and the Idea that intensity is able play this determining role in the process of the actualization or differenciation. However, Deleuze does very little to help us understand exactly what it means for intensity to ‘express’ Ideas. This paper will attempt to address this lack.

**The reality of religion in Hegel’s idealist metaphysics**  
**DIEGO BUBBIO**

In this paper, I explore the question of the reality of God for Hegel. I first consider the contemporary interpretative debate on Hegel’s metaphysics and the implications of this debate for the Hegelian conception of God. I then advocate for a ‘qualified revisionist’ approach to Hegel, and as a further qualification to such an approach, I suggest an interpretation of the objective reality that Hegel attributes to God as
mediated objectivity. I analyse how Hegel’s ‘mediated objectivity’ applies to religious representations, suggesting that a figural reading of the kind theorised by philologist Erich Auerbach should be adopted. Finally, I reconstruct Hegel’s distinction between the image (Bild) of God, the concept (Begriff) of God, and the Idea (Idee) of God, and I argue that the answer to the question of the objective reality of God in Hegel’s philosophy of religion can be retrieved in the process of turning the concept into the Idea.

**Political Generativity in Adorno and Merleau-Ponty**

DARCY BURGIN

This paper will explore Diana Coole’s account of politically efficacious negativity, or generativity, an immanent and non-foundational force that is simultaneously creative and destructive. Coole develops work by Adorno and Merleau-Ponty to generate an understanding of negativity that is opposed to postmodern accounts which, motivated by a fear of contamination by regressive forces, render negativity transcendent. These are impractical because they are too abstract for engaging current power relations, imagining or enacting new politics. They ignore our situatedness whilst generativity, on the other hand, responds reflexively to the political. Coole’s political negativity corresponds to a dialectical, temporal, and intersubjective ontology for which existence is too complex for the establishment of definitive meaning. Neither subjects nor objects can ever be fully “present” to subjects because meaning occurs through projects. Furthermore, the situations of subjects are irreconcilable. All intelligibility is made possible by the subordination of a negativity that threatens to disrupt it. Further elaborating this negativity, Coole turns to Adorno’s late work, significantly Negative Dialectics, which she claims develops a practical dialectics. She finds in Adorno’s dialectics a model of nonviolent relations between subjects and objects. Through exploring generativity, I will elaborate the connection between Merleau-Ponty’s ontology and Adorno’s dialectics.

**The problems of Nietzsche’s relational ontology**

RICCARDO CARLI

Inspired by Heraclitus and the philosophy of the Greeks’ tragic age, Nietzsche develops a description of the world that dismantles individualities and seeks the underlying structure of reality. Arguably, this structure is constituted by relations. In this respect, we could take Nietzsche’s famous description of “centres of force” as his attempt to build an ontology. In the so-called middle period, Nietzsche also pursues epistemological proofs of this ontology, drawing especially on Nineteenth century science: Boscovich, Roux and Lange are only three of the most important readings, in this sense.
However, any relational ontology suffers from a great problem: it is impossible for us to think about relations without relata. Our macroscopic world is composed of individualities, which may, as Nietzsche observes, be only human simplifications of reality, but which are nevertheless unavoidable. It would not be in itself a great problem for Nietzsche, since he precisely considers the anthropomorphistic activity of thought as a simplification. The problem is that a relational ontology transforms the familiar world we live in, constituted by individualities, into an unfamiliar world, constituted by relations: this dynamic is in tension with Nietzsche’s general conception of knowledge, as the reduction of the unknown to the known.

As suggested by some critics, it is possible to face this general problem stressing the role of will to power, in the late Nietzsche. To the same extent, Nietzsche’s Weltanschauung offers some original answers to other issues, generally associated to relational ontology. For example: the justification of the feeling of persistency, the ambiguous priority between relations and values, the apparent directionality and finalism of relations, the problem of their real or merely linguistic consistency. I will talk about some of these issues, hypothesizing also why Nietzsche’s relational ontology never becomes an explicit philosophical result, in his published works.

**Spinoza, Akrasia and Therapy**

**LEAH CARR**

*Akrasia* is commonly referred to as the “weakness of will” problem in moral philosophy. One knows what one should do but somehow fails to act in accord with their better judgement. Moments of *akrasia* motivate the pursuit of an ethics of self-cultivation, or a philosophical therapy, insofar as such relapses can be sourced in a lack of preparation or a deficiency in one’s character. By looking to how Spinoza understands *akrasia*, I hope to some further insight into Spinoza’s philosophical therapy and the moral psychology that underpins it. The view I will put forward, in line with authors such as Lin, Marshall and Soyarlsan is that *akrasia* can be understood as the comparative weakness of some affect induced by the thought of future consequence against an affect induced by some present stimulus. Rather than see ideas of the future as rational interventions, I will instead propose that *akrasia* is simply the failure of our cognitive capacity to extend our imaginations forward (and backward in time), which means that, reduced temporal extension should be understood as a reduction in sensitivity rather than an increase. This would mean that Spinoza’s account of *eudaimonia*—freedom from human bondage—might be understood as an intellectual relation to our temporal imaginaries, rather than the mastery of present passions by future concern (i.e
delayed gratification). This would yield two levels of *akrasia*—agent *akrasia*, the failure to delay gratification; and philosophical *akrasia*, the failure to intellectually relate to one’s passions and affects in a rational way. Overcoming philosophical *akrasia* ironically requires making concessions about our possibility of permanently overcoming agent *akrasia*, as a properly philosophical attitude to our embodied condition will view moments of agent *akrasia* to be the inevitable result of fluctuations in our power that result from interactions with our environment and the physiological condition of our bodies.

**Judith Butler and the fecundity of the unreadable**

**BARBARA CLARE**

This paper takes as a departure point and focus the question of Judith Butler’s, notorious unreadability. Given Butler’s argument that dominant norms of ‘intelligibility’ constrain the kinds of being that are able to appear in social fields (limiting who can be recognized, or who is valued) I make a case that the problem of reading is at the heart of ethics and politics as Butler conceives them. I foreground the manner in which Butler moves past Foucault’s account of one’s relation to norms and the manifestation of the subject within and through knowledge-power, through the emphasis she places on how the opacity of the self in describing the constitutive relationality by which the self is formed extends to a social opacity that requires us to engage with what is ‘unrecognizable’ about the other. Relinquishing the desire to assimilate that which we encounter into existing schemes of knowledge becomes the key imperative enacted both in Butler’s treatment of forms of sociality, and in her own mode of writing. I seek to thematize the desire for transparency as politically problematic, and precisely the target of some of Butler’s most incisive criticism. I argue for the importance of the practice of genealogical critique as that which informs the idea of unsettling the domain of ontology and draw out the opportunities for transformative social praxis this affords, including at the level of discursive practices of reading and writing.

**To Craft a Path to Healing: An introduction to the end of bionic vision restoration**

**TOMMY CLEARY**

This presentation will explore and describe the philosophical implications of Bionic Vision Restoration research: the restoration of sight with the aid of neurobionic devices can begin to test philosophical distinctions of mind, body and world.

The challenge of finding an adequate approach is encountered when the conceptual and neurobiological horizons of vision restoration are contemplated; where it is difficult to avoid thinking that implies that consciousness is nowhere or potentially everywhere. Well aware of the challenge of finding an adequate
approach, this presentation seeks to help craft a path to healing. It will aim for this goal by beginning with a contemplation of the embodiment of perception in the context of the prospect of vision restoration. Here in the flesh of perception phenomenology is demonstrably inescapable.

**Deleuze's concept of intensity in context: thermodynamics and transcendental philosophy**

**DALE CLISBY**

In the fifth chapter of *Difference and Repetition* Gilles Deleuze outlines the final movement in his complex metaphysics, key to which is the concept of ‘intensity.’

Deleuze faces a problematic at the outset of this chapter, stating: “we encounter severe difficulties when we attempt to consider Carnot’s or Curie’s principles as local manifestations of a transcendental principle” (Deleuze 1994, p. 223). For Deleuze, we only encounter forms of energy already distributed in extended form, and his project here is to uncover the intensive processes behind local extension. We are subsequently faced with the challenging task of considering intensity as a transcendental principle that becomes ‘cancelled’ in localised extended form. However, seemingly paradoxically, intensity remains implicated in itself even after being cancelled in extensity. Key to Deleuze’s argument for this thesis is the illusory nature of entropy, as “entropy is an extensive factor but, unlike all other extensive factors, it is an extension or ‘explication’ which is implicated as such in intensity, which does not exist outside the implication or except as implicated” (Deleuze 1994, p. 229).

This paper will trace the development of Deleuze’s argument in order to come to an understanding of the role of thermodynamics in Deleuze’s metaphysics and to thoroughly explore the way in which intensity becomes cancelled in extended form and remains implicated as ‘pure difference.’ This will be to discover entropy as a transcendental illusion and further highlight the importance of intensity in Deleuze’s philosophy.

**Walter Benjamin and the Language of Radio**

**HEATHER CONTANT**

Between the years 1929 and 1933 the philosopher and literary critic Walter Benjamin had a prolific career as a presenter in the Weimar Republic’s modern medium of radio. He wrote and delivered on-air lectures, had scripted conversations with other German intellectuals, and even developed a new form of radio drama. During this time Benjamin also cultivated some of his most famous philosophical theories surrounding the ‘aura,’ the politics of reproduction, and the Paris Arcades of the 19th century. This paper takes a critical look at Benjamin’s work as a radio practitioner,
examining it in comparison with his *Sprachtheorie* or theory of language, which uses themes from Jewish mysticism in order to explain how humans recognize correspondences in world, develop languages, and communicate. After outlining the history and constellation of energies that constituted Benjamin’s radio work, specific linguistic tactics—like mimicry, gibberish, citation—that Benjamin employed in his radio scripts will be examined. His experimentation with and creation of entirely new forms of radio drama will be considered as attempts to reconfigure the syntactical rules of the medium as it existed in the late Weimar Republic. Finally, the critical reflections that Benjamin made about Germany’s radio institution at this time will help to illuminate the reasons why Benjamin thought so little of his own involvement in the medium and explain how Benjamin thought that radio could be improved in order to better serve the public—suggestions that still remain potent today in the 21st century.

**Failure to Launch: Arendt, Eichmann, and the Banality of Evil**

**DANIEL CONWAY**

Hannah Arendt’s chief aim in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* was not to deliver a definitive reckoning of the biographical and psychological details of Eichmann’s life, but to initiate an investigation of the “new type of criminal” he exemplified. Toward this end, she delivered a “report” devoted not to the life and times of Adolf Eichmann, but to the newly emergent phenomenon of the banality of evil, which, she believed, would explain the heretofore unprecedented contributions of this “new type of criminal” to the commission of crimes against humanity. In doing so, she apparently wished to stage nothing short of a historical intervention, which would alert her readers to the appearance on the modern scene of a new, deadly, and altogether unrecognized manifestation of evil.

My aim in this paper is to offer a sympathetic interpretation of what Arendt called the banality of evil. Drawing on her scattered references to what does and does not constitute evil, I develop a profile of Eichmann that explains how and why the banality of his motives may be traced to his compromised agency. Unable to project himself imaginatively into the lives and experiences of his critics and victims, Eichmann failed to attain the minimum threshold of agency that is associated with criminal intent. He exemplified a “new type of criminal,” that is, inasmuch as he never fully realized what he was doing.

**On Music as Care**

**MICHAEL COOMBES**

The role of language in constituting being and reality was an abiding concern of existential philosophers but not all ways of being are discursive. How we build
musicality into an existential understanding of being and reality? Can existential concepts be developed to understand a specifically musical kind of Being, distinguishable from the kind of reality or consciousness constituted by words? Heidegger understands being-in-the-world in terms of temporality, as thrownness, fallen-ness and projection, a stream of consciousness through past, present and future, which makes it possible to orient ourselves in the world, as care. Care is structured by our being in time, which we can realise authentically or inauthentically. Musical care then would be how we can orient ourselves to the world through music. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the self as a lived worldly body, and knowing others through shared physical experience, also includes non-discursive being as manifest through music, and more generally the sensual musicality inherent to being. Merleau-Ponty develops an analogy between Heraclitus’ discussion of the flow of a river as analogous to lived time (temporality). I suggest that like Heraclitus’ river of being, music can situate us back in embodied, lived time. Music can therefore be a corrective to our ‘rational’ capacity to view space/time objectively, returning us to pre-rational lived time, being lived sensuously, temporally, in a structure of care, rather than as a succession of objective nows. Foregrounding our musicality foregrounds the tactileness of our being, and strengthens our subjectivity as a relation, disclosure and unfolding of self/world, in a way that the discursive intentionality cannot. Through music a sense of self that can be strengthened, by strengthening the sense of being as a dynamic sensuous self/world shared with others. Hopefully such reflections can help us understand the importance of human musical being in a viable society.

The Early Heidegger’s Interpretation of *kinesis* in His Lectures on Aristotle and Its Relevance to His Attempt to Understand Time as the Meaning of Being.
MARCO CRESPO

In this paper I critically assess Martin Heidegger’s early interpretation of Aristotle’s conceptualization of *kinesis* in terms of *dunamis* and *energeia* and its bearing on the “Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (Heidegger 1962, p 1). I begin with a survey of Heidegger’s criticisms of Aristotle’s definition of time in Being and Time and in lectures and seminars he delivered around the same period. As is well known to anyone who is familiar with Being and Time, Heidegger takes issue with Aristotle’s definition of time as the ‘number of motion in respect of “before” and “after”’ (Aristotle, *Physics* 219b1). In particular, this ordinary concept of time occludes a more primordial one, one which Heidegger elaborates in terms of the ecstatical unity of temporality. However, the question I wish to raise is does *kinesis* still have any relationship at all to time after Heidegger’s criticism of Aristotle’s definition of time? And if so, what is it? With
these questions in mind I turn to a very recent and novel interpretation of *kinêsis* in *Being and Time* by Joseph Carter in his paper “Heidegger’s *Sein zum Tode* as Radicalization of Aristotle’s Definition of *Kinêsis*.” I give a positive appraisal of Carter’s interpretation of *kinêsis* as implicit in Heidegger’s concept of Being-towards-death and Dasein’s ‘stretchedness’. Finally, I extend this investigation of *kinêsis* in *Being and Time* to the very constitution of ecstatical temporality and *Dasein*’s historicality.


*Sátántangó*: Merleau-Ponty and the Motion-Picture

MARK CUTLER

For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘style’ is a remarkable and contradictory word. He is fascinated by how the painter’s style can transform itself in every aspect and yet remain distinctly their own; how my style of handwriting persists whether I write with my finger on a fogged mirror, with a pen on paper, with a stick in the sand. I even perceive with a certain style—the world pulls my eye around it, sounds organize themselves in my ears, in a way not quite like it does for anyone else. It is something spontaneous and inescapable, yet also carefully cultivated. It is a manner of perceiving and affecting the world all at once.

I will argue that film is uniquely poised to display the many entwined notions of style Merleau-Ponty deploys. Film is the writer’s speech and the painter’s brushstroke all at once. It alone gives us the perceiving subject and perceived world, locked in mutual interplay. Using Merleau-Ponty’s later writings on aesthetics and examples from classic and contemporary narrative cinema, documentary and video art, I will explore how this medium teaches us about our own way of perceiving and being in the world.

The Concept of Life in Helmut Plissner’s Philosophical Antropology

MARc DE LEEUW

In his *Levels of the Organic and the Human Being* Helmut Plissner, one of the forgotten giants of the European tradition of philosophical anthropology, develops a
highly sophisticated philosophy of nature and community based on an intricate
description of the differentiating levels (Stufen) of organic/biological life. Central to
Plessner’s perspective is the relation between being a living body and having a
physical body: we live in our bodies (which are in their finiteness “unavailable”) as
organic creatures while we also have bodies as physical objects (that we keep fit,
manipulate, change, enhance).

The current inventions and manipulations of life by the biosciences produce
new configurations between the living body we are and the physical body we have,
this reconfiguration—for example in genetic, biometric, or synthetic “life forms”—
no longer fits the standard philosophical and legal categories of personhood,
autonomy and sovereign self-understanding (both individually and legally) causing
fundamental tensions in the referential relation and claim-making procedures of
“life and law”.

This paper examines the question if Plessner’s philosophy of organic life can
aid a deeper understanding of the current re-biologization of life and the impact this
will have on our human self-understanding as biological organisms on one side and
legal persons on the other side.

Lessons from the Aesthetic Regime Of Ranciere and The Talaandig
Artist Community of Bukidnon

Philosophy as a search for truth about reality is a field which has always been open to
re-examining its role amidst the changes in the world. In line with this, the paper
wishes to explore what can be learned from the aesthetic regime. In Rancière’s
works, art is recognized as a form of life, capable of questioning the spectator and the
system, proposing the rearrangement of space and visibility by appealing to the
participation of community. With the understanding that there is an equal
distribution of intelligence among political subjects, everyone has the capacity to
become emancipated spectators.

Rancière’s historiographical critique of the notion of aesthetics, introduces a
new way of looking into the arts as a concrete site of emancipation. Thus my paper is
a philosophical exploration of how aesthetics can break boundaries between art and
life as seen in the aesthetic theory of Jacques Rancière. The exploration will be done
by looking at the example of the Talaandig indigenous tribe from Bukidnon,
Philippines whose artists’ community have emerged through their various
advocacies, for instance, the conservation of nature, preservation of culture and a
sustainable lifestyle.

Along this line of thinking, the paper would like to respond to Rancière’s
statement about the possible task of art where he stated that “the archaeology of the
aesthetic regime of arts is not a matter of romantic nostalgia. Instead I think it can help us to set up in a more accurate way the issue of what art can be and can do today.”

**On Thinking : After Arendt and Ryle**
MAX DEUTSCHER

Hannah Arendt, in *The Life of the Mind*, takes a more overtly philosophical ‘turn’ in her renewed attention to the practice of thinking. She has a distinctive understanding of the value of thinking—its ‘privacy’ is a privation no less than a privilege. Even as she describes the value of this ‘breeze’ that ruffles our habitual use of concepts, she warns against glorifying thinking, or elevating, again, the traditional vita contemplativa. The business of thinking can help us to rescue and refashion ideas of freedom and will. We may resist those critics who regard the second volume of the projected trilogy—the work on Willing—as an unsatisfactory fragment. It is to be treated on the same level as Arendt’s accomplishment in Thinking. It is what she says about thinking in relation to willing that enables us to distinguish thinking from procrastination, and to resist the impulse within philosophy to repudiate politics.

In Gilbert Ryle’s own last phase of work—on thinking—the ambivalence towards behaviourism that he displays in *The Concept of Mind* is replaced by an even-handed rejection of both behaviourism and dualism. He enriches his writing on ‘mind’ with an account of thinking as public in its privacy while yet private in its publicity. His version of phenomenology still proceeds by means of a conceptual cartography. He thus take us further into the kind of philosophy at which Husserl and then Wittgenstein aimed—a kind of thinking that, rigorous and reasoned, exhibits an understanding of people in their various ‘worlds’. He shows how such philosophy may, without repudiating scientific knowledge, complement what we gain from the sciences.

This paper tracks these movements in Arendt and Ryle’s late work, taking up their legacies as a productive source of contemporary thinking.

**Vision and Its Double**
CATERINA DI FAZIO

It is by movement that the subject inscribes itself into the world and becomes visible to others. The subject is a movement directed to the outside, that is to say, the subject is desire. Thus life is nothing but the unfinished act of moving into space and, therefore, of creating space. In short, life is the movement that leads us towards the world and coincides with our desire to make it appear.
In this paper, I will try to demonstrate, through the analysis of several films realized between 1920 and 2000 and of a few significant essays from important film theorists, that a phenomenology of movement and space tacitly appears in films, as cinema is the art of motion on screen—and so of intersubjectivity par excellence. Moreover, I shall try to show that an ontological conception of the chiasm between the Visible and the Invisible (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and of the world as that “something else” that is simultaneously present and absent in every apparition (Jan Patočka), in cinema corresponds to the “présent in absentia” (Alain Bergala) of the off-screen on the screen, that is to say to the opening up of off-screen space by means of eyeline match and by characters exiting and entering the frame. I will finally claim that the use of sequence shot (or long take), of depth of field and of specific camera movements allows for the preservation of the continuity of reality, and gives the impression that the film is a perceptual experience that happens within reality’s space-time continuum.

Mise en Abyme and affirmation in Blanchot’s mechanism of Worklessness
IDDO DICKMANN

Mise en abyme is a narratological concept denoting a work that doubles itself within itself. In Diderot’s The Nun, for example, Suzanne explains the history of a letter to a correspondent of precisely this letter in which she explains that history. In Claude Simon’s L’Herbe, the lid of the cookie tin is decorated by a woman dressed in white who holds an identical box in her hand.

André Gide, the first theorist of mise en abyme, has described the concept in terms of a mechanism of retroaction:

I wanted to indicate In La Tentative the influence the book has on the author while he is writing it é A subject cannot act on an object without retroaction by the object on the subject that is acting.

Maurice Blanchot, in Space and Literature, cites this very passage from Gide, concluding that “all endeavors transform us; every action we accomplish acts upon us”. He then proceeds to model his philosophy of “ambiguity” and his mechanism of Worklessness (désoeuvrement) on mise en abyme.

I shall employ mise en abyme in order to solve a well-known problem in current research on Blanchot: his oscillation between ambiguity and affirmation. On the one hand, Blanchot argues uncompromising for the philosophy of ambiguity, for two competing “slopes”—presence and absence, “day” and the “night itself”—whose differences cannot ever be equalized, reconciled or mediated. On the other hand, he
argues for the “fatality of day”, thus assigning a prerogative to just one of these “slopes”.

Blanchot’s affirmation, I will argue, consists in the fact that incommensurable vectors (or circuits) of *mise en abyme* paradoxically coexist.

**Speculative Research, Temporality, and Politics**

**ROSALYN DIPROSE**

With reference to Isabelle Stengers’ interpretation of Whitehead’s idea of speculative philosophy and the revisionist ontologies of Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, and Jean-Luc Nancy, this paper explores the relationship between speculative thinking and politics. The link hinges on the futural temporality of speculation, which opens experience to possibility, the outcomes of which are unpredictable. Against assumptions within Australian politics that this kind of research is a waste of taxpayer’s money, I argue that speculation, so understood, is crucial to political agency, democratic pluralism, and innovation. Time permitting, the paper also explores how those same ontologies, by virtue of practicing speculative philosophy, reopen paths for thinking and it offers suggestions for how speculation can be practiced in humanities teaching and research.

**“I am my own foundation”: Frantz Fanon’s Disavowed Cartesianism**

**SIMONE DRICHEL**

Few lines are as instantly recognised in postcolonial circles as Frantz Fanon’s “final prayer” in *Black Skin, White Masks*: “O my body, make of me always a man who questions!” What is less instantly recognised, however, is that what speaks through these lines—and *Black Skin* more generally—is an oblique engagement with Descartes’ *Meditations on First Philosophy*. On a superficial reading, the quality of Fanon’s engagement with Descartes is clearly of a critical nature: countering Descartes’ renunciation of the body, Fanon invests the body with his very capacity for critique. Significantly, what a more careful reading of *Black Skin* reveals, however, is that what runs counter to this anti-Cartesian “final prayer” is a decidedly Cartesian strand. Largely disavowed, this Cartesian strand moves to the surface only in the concluding paragraphs, which see Fanon declare: “The body of history does not determine a single one of my actions. I am my own foundation.”

How do we read this curious reinstatement of the Cartesian self-founding “I”? This paper proposes that to make sense of the strange tussle between Cartesian and anti-Cartesian gestures we need to read *Black Skin* as a trauma text. In other words, I suggest that the involuntary invocation of a Cartesian gesture stands as evidence of repetition compulsion—pointing to an unresolved trauma right at the heart of Fanon’s text. What is at stake in the particular re-reading of *Black Skin* proposed
here is hence a making conscious of the precise nature of the colonial trauma that holds Fanon in its grips. This trauma, I suggest, is intimately entangled with an understanding of the colonial situation as a “double narcissism”: a diagnosis Fanon himself offers in *Black Skin*, without, however, fully registering either its specific origins in relational trauma or its implications for negotiating nonviolent forms of postcolonial relationality.

**The Idea of Expression in Phenomenology**
ANDREW DUNSTALL

Expression is an important theme in the history of European philosophy, notable in thinkers from Spinoza, to Hegel and Husserl. In this paper, I show the changing approaches to expression in phenomenology, and the theoretical consequences that result. In particular, I focus on locating with respect to each other the expressive ontology of Merleau-Ponty and the attention given expression by Derrida. The latter is supposed by some (Charles Taylor, for example), to tacitly propose a radical subjectivism when it comes to meaning. I argue, however, that Derrida's position comes much closer to Merleau-Ponty's on expression than is usually recognised. Derrida's position is better described as a case of “inheritance”, where expression comes about through grappling with the conflicting demands of the past.

**Negativity, Dispossession and Language in Lyotard’s *Discourse, Figure***
RYAN EDWARDS

In Jean-François Lyotard's masterful book *Discourse, Figure*, a rigorous critique of structuralist linguistics is carried out—the lesson of which is worth reminding ourselves of today: "the given is not a text". Seeing is not reading. Thus Lyotard protests, mobilising Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology against various linguistic theorists and semioticians who might rest contentedly speaking of signifiers and signifieds without realising the thickness on the margins of discourse: that of designation. The purpose of this paper is to draw out from this dense work the central role that Lyotard accords to negativity in two different guises concerning language and discourse. In agreement with Saussure, Lyotard holds that there are only negative differences between terms in the language system (la langue), but he also emphasises another fundamental negativity that is constitutive of the experience of seeing, the negativity of the space of reference. Between these two negations there is no dialectical recuperation to be made, nor any kind of reduction of the one to the other. It follows from this that we are dispossessed of the object that is front of discourse, never to be totally subsumed under conceptual signification. This is not to be lamented, but does of course have consequences for knowledge.
In charting these arguments set forth by Lyotard, and his analyses and critiques of Saussure, Hegel and Frege, I hope to emphasise the importance of this work today, as a kind of idealism or textualism still seems predominant within much of the humanities.

**Heidegger between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics**

INGO FARIN

In his new book *Making Sense of Heidegger*, Thomas Sheehan argues for what he calls a “paradigm shift” in interpreting Heidegger. Instead of belabouring the so-called “turn” in Heidegger or the distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, Sheehan gives a unified account of Heidegger according to which he is best seen as a phenomenologist, from his early works through to his last writings. I argue that this is a simplifying and reductionist interpretation that does not do justice to Heidegger’s account of meaning, his overall very strong hermeneutical impetus, and his interpretations of language and poetry, in particular with regard to Hölderlin.

**The Ontology of Childhood and the Possibility of Political Change: an Essay on Relationality**

JOANNE FAULKNER

Childhood is a relatively neglected area of study in the humanities, even as children have never before been as central a focus socially, culturally, and politically, in affluent nations such as Australia and New Zealand. The viability of childhood as an ideal form that children embody for us is regarded with increasing anxiety. And in recent years, the burdens borne socially by working class and Aboriginal children has also been an object of scrutiny, through inquiries into child sex abuse in religious and other institutions, as well as the inquiry into the stolen generations in Australia.

This paper argues that the figure of the child is in these and other instances the bearer of both significance and of harm, because its conceptual delineations so readily articulate an in-between state, or interval, through which the relation to an other is both enabled and avoided. Most obviously, this interval that the child embodies is the relation between the sexes; and Luce Irigaray has argued that the reification of the sexual relation in the figure of the child freezes and stultifies the possibilities between men and women, preventing a more open and fruitful negotiation between them. Likewise, in postcolonial politics, too, the ascendency of the child as a figure for the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians, I will argue, fixes the terms of engagement in a potentially unproductive direction.
Elements for an ontology of action
OLIVER FELTHAM

The working hypothesis for this paper is that one can award ontological priority to action rather than to substance, subject or process. So far philosophical modernity has not succeeded in removing action from the matrix of Aristotle’s productivist metaphysics of substance, despite Locke’s nominalist attempt to desubstantialize action, Leibniz’s attempt to fuse the categories of action and substance, and Kant’s conception of the subject of apperception as self-affecting activity. In their philosophies the being of action still ends up being effaced behind juridical or theological categories. The first key for an ontology that unfolds the multiplicity of action is found in another part of Aristotle’s oeuvre than his metaphysics, his politics. There we can find the beginnings of a meditation on the ontological primacy of action in the generation of two very specific kinds of being—the citizen and the city-state. The second key is found in another moment in philosophical modernity—Rousseau’s meditations on the citizen and the city-state. Five indicators for the being of action can be found in the ethical and political problems that emerge in Rousseau’s philosophy: the gap between speaking and acting evident in hypocrisy; the lack of measure between an action and its punishment; agents’ lack of control over the consequences of their actions, the spontaneous formation of factions and cabals, and finally the difficulty encountered in the application of a law to a particular case. The goal of the paper is to identify the minimum requirements for an ontology of action based on Rousseau’s ethical and political investigation of the modern condition of the city-state.

Wild Psychoanalysis, Feral Philosophy
ROBYN FERRELL

‘Wild Psychoanalysis’, Freud writes in the paper of that name, is a dangerous practice by which physicians with a poor understanding of psychoanalytic technique attempt to apply its diagnoses anyway. The result can be harmful to the patient, he warns, but even more harmful to the reputation of the fledging science of psychoanalysis. It prompts him to form the International Association to license and protect psychoanalysis.

But this failed to contain the beast. Like a feral animal—one who was domesticated, but has gone wild—psychoanalysis slipped the fence of its authorised medical field. It ‘went viral’, spreading its associations through the cultural worlds it contacted, infecting them all—media, literature, social sciences, art and philosophy—with its virulent interpretations.

The rhetoric of the dream image, spelled out by Freud in chapters six and seven of the Interpretation of Dreams, contributes to this productive pandemic by
analysing a common text in strikingly modern terms. The legacy in structuralist and poststructuralist linguistics and semiotics is well known. But have these fields, now cultivated as ‘visual culture’, become wild psychoanalysis? Or does the interpretation of dreams give rise to a ‘feral philosophy’?

“The beautiful housekeeping of the universe”—dialogues between Romanticism and New Zealand indigenous philosophies

NORMAN FRANKE

Since the collapse of states organised and run Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist forms of socialist ideologies, latterly marginalized and discredited ideas of Romantic Socialism have made a slow but steady come-back in European scholarship and politics. M. Löwy (1981, 1998, 2001), T. Ziolkowski (1990, 2013) et. al. have demonstrated how discourses of libertarian socialism and environmentalism inspired by early German Romanticism have influenced (post-) modern international Green movements, environmental anti-capitalism, and communitarian cultural projects.

The connections between Romantic discourses of nature, language and politics and those of indigenous philosophies are just beginning to attract the attention of scholars and social practitioners. In a New Zealand context, a scholarly dialogue between Romantic and Matauranga Māori ideas began with the Symposium In die Natur, Ki te Wheiao, Into Nature, University of Waikato and Waikato-Tainui College for Research and Development, Hopuhopu, 2011 (s. also Franke, Mika 2011).

Using Novalis’ The Apprentices of Saïs as a starting point, this paper discusses commonalities and similarities between Matauranga Māori philosophies (L T Smith 1999) and early Romantic writings in the fields of philosophy of nature, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language and social and political philosophy with a view to pointing out potential areas of social and cultural implementation.

‘Concrete Freedom’: Hegel’s Answer to the Question of ‘what it is to be free?’

LOUGHLIN GLEESON

Answering the question of ‘what it is to be free?’ is of great practical-philosophical significance, as it bears on the status (metaphysical or otherwise) of individual persons and their actions and, more broadly, on the normative legitimacy of social norms and institutions. Hegel’s answer, which is developed in terms of the concept of ‘concrete freedom’ (konkrete Freiheit), offers us not just an alternative to the conventional liberal and Kantian models and their respective aporias, but also a holistic model which encompasses: (i) ‘internal’ and ‘external’ nature (Natur); (ii) recognitively mediated intersubjective interactions and relations; and (iii) the
institutions and attendant norms constitutive of an historically emergent ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit). For he argues that freedom, far from referring to the subjective capacity for ‘free choice’ (Willkür), or even a rational achievement made possible by dutiful adherence to the moral law, is a fundamentally relational state or condition obtaining between self and ‘other’ generally understood that is marked by the positive reconciliation or union with otherness and difference. Freedom so understood is embodied in Hegel’s somewhat peculiar expression ‘being-with-one-self-in-the-other’ (bei sich Selbstsein im Andern). That, as intimated above, arguably applies to the totality of practical conditions both experienced and produced by human beings under the systematic framework of ‘Geist’.

**Critical analysis of the philosophical conception of verification of being/the self in Heidegger's *Being and Time* against dao/the other in Laozi's *Daodejing***

LUCIAN GREEN

That dao and being are correct as written about by Laozi and Heidegger respectively is exposed through eight perspectival points of verificationalism (which is correct because of the connectionism present in texts), connectionism present in texts, communication (which is correct because of the professional development of the other), professional development of the other, articulation (which is correct because of economic role-earning), accreditation, universalisation, and mimickry of nature. I aimed to model the verification of Heidegger’s ontology with Laozi’s nothingness on business, education and having children with Pedagogy. I will examine the magna opera Laozi’s *Daodejing* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.

**Reconciling Critical Theory and Biopolitics?***

JOHN GRUMLEY

The relation between bio-politics and critical theory is of particular interest in contemporary radical thought because, while both remain prominent, these two paradigms have typically been seen in opposition to one another. This paper will critically examine contemporary efforts now proposing a possible reconciliation between these two traditions. An exemplary model of this project is Miguel Vatter’s *The Republic of the Living*. He contends that modern government has become biopolitical by incorporating biological life into the calculations of political rationality. In order to counteract such “normalisation”, Vatter recommends an “affirmative politics” of the living, one that escapes the techniques envisaged to administer and govern life. Only a dual perspective that is both republican and a critique of political economy will successfully contest a neo-liberal civil society. Vatter even maintains that the biopolitical basis of such a critique was already laid
down by the tradition of critical theory from Hegel and Marx through to Benjamin and Adorno. To restore such a biopolitical critique of political economy to its rightful position in a contemporary thought and to bring this critique to bear on contemporary neo-liberal government, Vatter asserts that it is crucial to raise the descriptive and normative profile of the concept Zoé or species life within the critical theory tradition. In other words, a biopolitical reading of the critical theory tradition is required for a more potent critical instrument in the struggle with neo-liberal governmentality. This paper will critique this proposition by examining the tensions between this biopolitical reading of critical theory and the latter’s fundamental perspectives and values. The proposal to shift the emphasis in the critical theory tradition on to Zoé is not without its own problems and raises a number of key interpretative and theoretical tensions that are not fully acknowledged in Vatter’s reading.

**Freedom and Modern Subjectivity: Recasting a Notion of Radical Freedom**  
RICARDO JOSE GUTIERREZ

The hallmark of Modern Philosophy and modernity in general is the relentless articulation of the value of human freedom and the aversion to those who stand against its illuminating grace. Aggravated further by the horrors of Nazism and Stalinism, such formidable legacy has been nailed deeper into the consciousness of contemporary thought. With a slight exaggeration, it is now more than ever that the greater part of the global village seeks freedom and revels in its boundless potential for emancipation and progress. Evidently, it has seeped into every nook and cranny of much of the fundamental interests of contemporary human society to the point that one can speak of the “omnirelevance” of freedom in everyday life.

But to champion freedom in such a pervasive way requires an elementary consideration of the agent of freedom first and foremost. In this regard, there arises the necessity to map out the current dominant conceptions about the human being in lieu of assessing whether such conceptions could bring to light a more significant understanding of ourselves and our fascination to freedom. This paper therefore dares to re-echo the archives of philosophical anthropology concerning the dominant ideas about the human being as established by the different fields of Science (Darwinism), Philosophy (Post-Structuralism and Phenomenology), Sociology (Marxism), and Psychoanalysis (Slavoj Žižek). The goal of this cognitive mapping is to assess the strong points and limits of each conception in the attempt to measure them against their ability to account for a notion of freedom that can rise to the demand of the contemporary period for a radical understanding of emancipation in general. It is my claim that this abstract idea of freedom should be taken
advantage of to the extent that any normative claim about the human being today should be grounded on it.

**Wittgenstein’s Aspects and Phenomenological Objects**
**AARON HARRISON**

There is a reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect-seeing that takes it as a kind of phenomenology, and takes an aspect (*Aspekt*) to be a phenomenological object. Although there may be a sense in which Wittgensteinian aspects correspond to phenomenological objects, such a reading neglects other significant strands in the aspect-seeing remarks. This neglect obscures the very general meaning of Aspekt as a feature of something, which gains methodological significance. Such a reading also neglects the distinction between philosophy as description of experience, and description of experience as that upon which philosophy is done. I will attempt to offer a reading of the aspect-seeing remarks in which Wittgenstein’s phenomenological voice is set against other prominent voices in the text.

**Conceptualizing A More Robust Conception of Emancipation**
**WILLIAM HEBBLEWHITE**

The concept of Emancipation is much broader and conceptually heavier than has been otherwise recognized in contemporary political philosophy. Emanating from Roman Law where it had connotations with property and ownership, Emancipation has, I argue, become synonymous with Freedom. Through an analysis of the usage of the term in the work of Marx, Laclau, Honneth and Fraser I argue that these theorists conceive of emancipation too narrowly. In this paper I lay the groundwork for a re-thinking of the concept in question which attempts to develop it in terms terms of temporality, autonomy and activity.

**Feminist Theory after Bergson: Determination and Indetermination in the Tendencies of Sexual Difference**
**REBECCA HILL**

Much feminist and queer theory of the last thirty years is avoidant or even hostile to engaging with the concept of nature (Rubin, Butler). This is understandable in the context of the pervasive association of nature with patriarchal fixity and heteronormativity. Theorists such as Grosz and Wilson have problematized anti-natural feminisms and queerisms and argued respectively for an open and changeable concept of nature and for feminist and queer engagements with contemporary biology.
This paper takes up Bergson’s concepts of indetermination and determination as a way to think an open and changeable concept of nature, which is nonetheless oriented to engender specific directions in the becoming of life.

Focusing on Bergson’s *Creative Evolution*, I propose that indetermination and determination are suggestive for conceptualizing sexual differentiation as natural without falling into a reductive determinism or sexed hierarchy. But these concepts require some rethinking because Bergson associates indetermination with the duration of life and hierarchically opposes this “freedom” to matter, which he defines as approaching determination. I have argued elsewhere that this hierarchy is fundamental to his project and acts out a phallic anthropomorphism in which Bergson associates indetermination with masculinity and determination with femininity (2012). Drawing on aspects of Bergson’s oeuvre that undermine this opposition and on the Neo-Finalism of Ruyer, I suggest that the concepts of determination and indetermination should not be hierarchized. Determination is valuable for thinking the pervasive tendency to sexual differentiation in the evolution of an extraordinary variety of species on Earth. The pliability in the way specific tendencies are actualized can be conceived through the concept of indetermination, which is a necessary feature of the becoming of the world.

**Ecophilia and Ecopedagogy**

**RUHYU HUNG**

A human being is inevitably situated in a particular place with other beings. This paper interrogates what it means to relate with one’s surroundings and other beings in a sound and amiable way. Deliberating on E. O. Wilson’s idea of biophilia and Yi Fu Tuan’s notion of topophilia, I coin the term ‘ecophilia’, which means human beings’ affective and embodied bond with the place and nature. Biophilia means ‘the innately emotional affiliation of human beings to other living organisms’ (Wilson, 1993, p. 31), whereas topophilia means ‘the affective bond between people and place or settings’ (Tuan, 1974, p. 4).

Furthermore, I propose that education that aims to foster ecophilia can be referred to as ‘ecopedagogy’, which pursues an appropriately reciprocal relationship between humankind and nature that includes all living beings as well as non-living beings. Such pedagogy, I will argue, should be based on our body and our embodied experience. Ecopedagogy is an embodied pedagogy striving to cultivate human affinity with all lifelike processes and abiotic factors.
Intercultural Respect for Human Dignity through the Body
RUYYU HUNG

The idea of universal human rights faces many challenges of non-Western societies. The idea of human rights is thought to be a Western idea by some so that it does not work so well in the non-western regions as it does in the west. Among the attacks of the idea of universal human rights, the strongest claim is the assertion of Asian Values. It is supported by ‘leaders of prosperous and entrepreneurial East and Southeast Asian countries’.

As an educator as well as a philosopher of education born and brought up in the East Asian society, I do not intend to solve the debate over the Asian values and universal human rights in theory. Rather, what I aim to do is to explore the concept of bodily respect for human dignity, which, for me, is a starting point of intercultural understanding of human rights. Bodily respect for human dignity is the bridge between Western and Eastern approaches to human rights. The key to the intercultural bridge is the body. The living body that is able to feel, to act, to affect, to perceive, to respond, to receive, to eat, to breathe, to care and to relate to other bodies is an unique individual and at the same time shares commonalities with others. The body is a mit-sein, a being-with. The way the body relates to others does not rely on the incorporeal thought but on the corporeal interactions.

The remainder of the paper will first elaborate on the meanings of human dignity and respect. The paper will show that dignity consists in the embodiment of respect from the Western and Eastern perspectives. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Mencius, this paper articulates the profound meaning of the living body and its implications for intercultural interpretation of respect for human dignity.

Return to Reification
HEIKKI IKÄHEIMO

Axel Honneth’s book Reification is an important attempt at rehabilitating a central concept in the left-Hegelian tradition, an attempt that nevertheless remains curiously left aside in Honneth’s subsequent work. Perhaps discouraged by a somewhat negative reception of the book, perhaps by internal problems in his elaborations in it, or perhaps both, Honneth has not continued developing the ideas he presents in it, and at least in one publicized occasion he seems to have more or less abandoned the project. In my view there is much to recommend in attempts to rehabilitate reification as a critical concept in social philosophy. What I wish to do in this presentation is to sketch out a systematic model for thinking of reification and its central dimensions: reification of persons, reification of social structures, and reification of nature. After a few conceptual clarifications on the different applications of the concept or concepts of reification, and I concentrate on one of
these applications—reification of other persons. I will have quite a few things to say about a centrally important topic in Honneth’s treatise of reification, one which Butler rightly puts her finger on in her discussion of Honneth: what exactly it means to take up the perspective of the other person. Though I will draw on a number of ideas in Honneth’s account of recognition, both in *Reification* and in his path-breaking *The Struggle for Recognition*, his conceptualization of the theme is burdened with certain ambiguities and unresolved tensions which I will try to clarify, working thereby towards a more conceptually controlled and thus practically useful conception of reification as a tool for immanent social critique.

**Heidegger’s captivating use of language**  
ANDREW INKPIN

The way Heidegger uses language in his philosophical prose is both highly distinctive and notoriously divisive, being admired and maligned in equal measure, albeit often without adequate understanding of either its sophistication or underlying motives. This paper aims to contribute to a more informed assessment of both the virtues and vices of Heidegger’s language use by arguing that it constitutes a virtuoso but flawed experiment in philosophical writing. I begin by drawing on several passages from *Unterwegs zur Sprache* that exemplify the ways in which Heidegger exploits peculiarities of the German language to develop (untranslatable) associations and resonances between words. The fact that these resonances are intended to be heard not only in the context of Heidegger’s writing, but as echoing throughout language more generally, sheds light on why Heidegger’s language use can appear so captivating to many readers. The second part of the paper outlines how Heidegger’s developed conception of language in this work provides a grounding for his language use, the complexities of which are not accidental, but a performative implementation of his view of language as a process of historically embedded ‘showing’ (*Zeigen*) and ‘saying’ (*Sagen*). I conclude the paper by critically assessing Heidegger’s approach. I suggest that although it would be confused to object to Heidegger’s linguistic style on specifically political grounds, the spirit of enchantment and constraint that pervades his later work in particular is unappealing. Ultimately, however, I argue that the main problem with Heidegger’s language use is that it is based on an untenable conception of language, specifically on an overly simplistic model of the function of linguistic signs and the temporality of language.
Feminist Epistemology and Climate Change
JACK ISHERWOOD

It is clear that climate change is a site of profound political polarization in contemporary democracies. Moreover, there is growing alarm in scientific circles about the disconnect between the urgency of the climate crisis vis-a-vis the failure of global governments to implement appropriate mitigation and adaption policies and recent sociological research which highlights significant public distrust in scientific bodies and even decreasing concern about climate change.

Unsurprisingly, this situation raises significant issues with respect to how climate change activists should frame their public claims, especially in the face of organized attempts by vested interests to cast doubt on scientific knowledge and to publicly undermine governmental initiatives to reduce carbon emissions.

I argue that feminist epistemological theory can offer important insights with respect to how greater consensus can be built regarding the need to decarbonize our economic institutions and the need to change often deeply settled lifestyle patterns and routines. Feminist theories of epistemology foreground the limitations of understanding ignorance as if it merely constitutes an absence or deficit of knowledge. Instead, it stresses the complex interconnections between individuals’ social positionings and their worldviews and self-interpretations of their identities. In addition, it also stresses how knowledge discourses are never morally and politically neutral as they inherently serve particular interests or agendas while marginalizing, excluding or dismissing others.

Consequently, I shall outline a wide range of potential communicative strategies based on feminist epistemic principles which might engender greater relations of trust between scientific experts and the “lay” public, more positively motivating frames to inspire behavioural change and greater segmented audience discrimination approaches for campaign purposes. I shall conclude by surveying some practical examples of this kind of approach being used by Australian environmental activists and illustrate some future possibilities for research in this area.

Towards a Genealogy of Normativity
MARK KELLY

Michel Foucault charged that in modern societies the norm has displaced the older form of the law. This development is associated by Foucault with the growing importance of biological and medical knowledge in social organisation. Such discourses invoke a scientific concept of ‘normality’ that has in the past two centuries passed from being a technical notion to a word which pervades our everyday lives in the form of an ever-present concern with being ‘normal’ in various
dimensions, particularly with being and remaining psychologically and physically healthy. But Foucault indicates a broader shift towards the model of the norm affecting the law itself.

Foucault does not himself explore this last insight in detail. I wish to extend Foucault’s attention to the invocation of norms in relation to ‘normality’, to the invocation of norms in the notion of the ‘normative’, in the two core normative disciplines of jurisprudence and ethics. In so doing, I intend to extend Foucault’s genealogy of normalisation to produce a genealogy of normativity. The notion of the ‘normative’ is a much more recent one than that of the ‘normal’, having become prominent only during the twentieth century, but it has during that time become a pervasive concept in the humanities and social sciences. I trace the emergence of this concept to earlier transformations in ethics and legal theory dating back to the end of the eighteenth century, and coinciding closely with the rise of the concept of norms in the life sciences. I cast this rise of the ‘normative’ as an adaptation to and aping of the discourses of the normal by the much older fields of law and morals.

From Biopolitical Regulation to Infopolitical Fastening: Re-Historicising the Critique of Power
COLIN KOOPMAN

Michel Foucault’s genealogies provide us with conceptual capabilities that remain robust today. But where Foucault’s milieu was defined by prison politics, the politicization of sexuality, and growing suspicions of the psy-sciences, our contemporary assemblage is being reconstituted by strange swirls of informatics spanning from social media to big data, by ethereal instruments of finance capital analytics, and by enormous state apparatuses monitoring gigantic information flows. This paper presents ongoing work from a genealogy of our present which reveals that these contemporary informatic regimes are anything but brand new. This genealogy shows how informatics regimes began to stabilize in the first decades of the 20th century and then assumed solidity by 1948 (when Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics, Claude Shannon founded information theory, and George Orwell wrote his masterpiece 1984).

To develop such a genealogy I employ Foucault’s historicizing methods without remaining tied to his concepts. Thus I aim to interrogate a historical shift in the way power works. I argue that we find ourselves midst a form of power that first emerged within the frames of biopower but has since assumed a gravity of its own. I refer to this as infopower. This argument depends on an analytical separation of biopower and infopower in terms of two aspects: techniques and targets.

I argue that infopower is irreducible to the biopolitical ‘regulation’ (technique) of ‘living populations’ (target). It is rather a ‘fastening’ (a double technique involving
tying down and quickening up) of ‘data subjects’ (a target I also call ‘informational persons’). I first explicate Foucault’s discussions of biopolitical regulation in ‘The Will to Know’ (‘HSv1’) and the 1976 (‘SMBD’) and 1978 (‘STP’) Collège de France lectures. I then delineate the contours of infopolitical fastening by way of a genealogical case study of the emergence of scientific personality psychology between 1917 and 1937.

Communal atonement and impossible ethical demands
MARGUERITE LA CAZE

What kind of atonement or forms of atonement can contribute to restoring an ethical political community after political violence or oppression? This paper considers how a community can atone for past violence and oppression, in spite of its apparently impossible ethical demands, as outlined by Vladimir Jankélévitch, Arendt, and Derrida. One problem is that there may not be subjects who are able to or who wish to receive atonement. Survivors of the atrocity may be few and unwilling to accept any gestures to make up for the past. Second, the wrong may be so extreme that no form of atonement appears commensurable. Moreover, there may not be offenders willing to offer atonement, since they may be unrepentant or even triumphant, as appears to be the case in relation to the genocide against suspected communists in Indonesia in the 1960s, for example. I argue that first the violence itself has to be exposed and acknowledged, and then explore how atonement can be offered and experienced through symbolic and practical means of apologies, memorials, commemorations, and reparations or making amends, to attempt to overcome the impossibility of atonement.

Deleuze's Bartleby
NORMA LAM-SAW

The titular character of Herman Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” has been recognised by continental philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt and Giorgio Agamben as a figure of “The New Christ,” of “Absolute refusal” and as a “New Messiah.” These identifications share a recognition of the fundamentally passive way in which Bartleby, and his utterances of, “I would prefer not to” characterise a resistance that destabilises structures of power.

In this paper I will look at Deleuze’s recognition of Bartleby as a figure of “The New Christ.” According to Deleuze, Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” performs an agrammatical formula that renders a zone of indistinction between the representation order of words and things. For Deleuze, this formula not only pushes language to its very limits to an outside or a silent madness, but in doing so constitutes a new language, a madness that is founded on a logic of preference.
Deleuze argues Bartleby thus creates this logic of preference where what is preferred is always rendered impossible by the nonpreferred. This logic takes the form of a madness that is not Bartleby’s madness in particular, but a stupor that surrounds him. In such a way, Deleuze argues that Bartleby with his “schizophrenic vocation,” not only resists the function of a patriarchial hegemony, but like a doctor to a sick America, liberates us all as a New Christ, by instigating a new fraternal logic.

**Thinking Through Moral Distress with Simone de Beauvoir**

CHRISTINIA LANDRY

In my paper I argue that moral distress—resulting from a bioethical dilemma—teaches us something fundamental about being human, i.e., other people’s projects matter to us in a deeply embodied way. As one is unable to preserve all projects simultaneously, an ethical dilemma presents itself as a conflict between moral imperatives wherein following one course of action results in transgressing another. This emphasizes the notion that not all human actions may be successful, but rather that much of them are destined to failure. Moral distress is a result of precisely this failure. In order to advance this claim, I turn to Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics. Although she does not present us with ethical imperatives, Beauvoir does offer us a way to think through our relations with others via her existential-phenomenology, which does not seek to disentangle the complexity of our moral commitments. Over and beyond what is prima facie an instrumental claim, Beauvoir argues we desire the flourishing of others via free action and that moral distress reifies the failure to meet this desire. Before turning to Beauvoir, I use a quotidian medical case example to examine the relationship between moral distress and Beauvoir’s phenomenalistic-existentialism. Here I demonstrate how moral distress not only reveals our desire for the flourishing of others, but how it also exposes the deeply ambiguous, agonizing, and often alienating nature of being in the world with others.

**The Anthropocene and Bruno Latour’s “reconstituted human”**

RACHAEL LANE

Building on Latour’s contribution to the Anthropocene debate, this paper assesses a philosophical framework that sets out the relationship of micro-scale human action to the macro-scale of the planet, and also attempts to define the Anthropocene in a more rigorous fashion, and forge a limit on its signify, so it can be useful to the humanities and social sciences. The transition from the geological epoch of the Holocene to the Anthropocene, on the one hand, is viewed as unworthy of serious consideration by the hard sciences, dismissing it as nothing more than a popular culture phenomenon. On the other hand, for disciplines such as anthropology, and
to a lesser extent archaeology, the new epoch has prompted theory and research, and the serious reconsideration of ‘the human’ in terms of ontology and planetary impact. Against the backdrop of the Anthropocene, Latour makes the claim that “humans have been reconstituted somewhere near the centre,” and this is a foundational claim for a new ontology of the planetary. A number of conditions of modernity serve to complicate and constrain a larger-scale planetary view, including the tendency of humans to think in presentist terms, and moreover, the focus on planning for the future. Latour further claims, “in modernism, people are not equipped with the mental and emotional repertoire to deal with such a vast scale of events”. The tendency to think with a short-time span negates the ability of the long-term past to provide insight into the present state of climate change. William Connolly wants to ditch some of the conditions of modernity namely dismissing the past “to avoid thinking about the future looming before us.” Thinking about the Anthropocene proposes a viable relationship with the large scale so humans can conceptualizes changing material and environmental conditions over expanded spans of time and space.

**Ontology and the Ethical Foundations of Marx’s Thought**

**MICHAEL LAZARUS**

There is a strongly held belief among commentators that because Marx only wrote sparingly (and rarely directly) about ethics, that no coherent moral theory can be drawn from his work. This paper presents a case against these views. Instead, I argue there is a clear line of continuity in Marx’s approach to ethics, from his early philosophical writings to his mature economic work. While this topic has been a mainstay of ‘Marxology’, fresh scholarship has once again reinvigorated the debate proving the centrality of ethics to the discussion of Marx’s philosophy. At the same time, it shows that the basis of ‘ethics’ itself must be fully explored. To escape a surface level analysis that rests strictly upon ‘The Famous Quotations’, historically too commonly found in these debates, I argue ethics is linked to the much deeper category of ontology.

This paper contends that ethics cannot be separated from social ontology. This conceptual category offers wide explanatory power when looking at Marx’s philosophy. Ontology, in Marx’s usage, is based on social labour. It is seen to define human beings, transforming the world around them and themselves. Marx sees humans as social animals, bonded together via labour. This allows for a critique of the divisions that divorce people from the ability to realise that labour fully. By drawing on the intellectual influences that inform Marx, an important dimension of this conception is brought to light. Aristotle and Hegel are the towering figures here. Vitally, Marx transforms this inheritance through labour. This paper bases an
understanding of Marx’s philosophy in connection to social ontology and underscores the influence of Aristotle.


**Human Rights and the Care of the Self**

ALEX LEFEBVRE

In this talk I propose that a consistent and historic function of human rights is to inspire individuals to a new way of life. I have two aims. First, to demonstrate that throughout the human rights tradition is a belief that human rights are an indispensable means to work upon and care for the self (as described by Michel Foucault). And second, to identify a few of the concrete techniques prescribed in human rights law and literature to effect this transformation. My goal is to sketch a new theory and history of human rights from the perspective of a care for one’s own self.

**Political Matters. Conceptual ambiguities and unresolved tensions in new materialist scholarship**

THOMAS LEMKE

Recently, social and political theory has demonstrated a renewed theoretical interest in matter and materiality. The “new materialism”, as it is sometimes called encompasses a plurality of different approaches and disciplinary perspectives, ranging from science and technology studies via feminist theory and political philosophy to geography. The new materialist scholarship shares the conviction that the “linguistic turn” or primarily textual accounts are insufficient for an adequate understanding of the complex and dynamic interplay of meaning and matter. The talk critically engages with the ontological underpinnings and the political perspectives of the new materialism. By focusing on the work of Jane Bennett and her idea of “vibrant matter”, I will discuss conceptual ambiguities and unresolved tensions in new materialist scholarship. The talk seeks to clarify these theoretical problems and argues for a relational account of agency and ontology that allows for a more materialist account of politics.
Redeeming Richard Rorty: Self-Creation and Solidarity as Strategies for Self-Enlargement
TRACY LLANERA

Two of the strongest prevailing criticisms against Richard Rorty’s political and social philosophy revolve around his unapologetic position of ethnocentrism and the untenability of his private/public distinction. While Rorty does not lack defenders in contemporary scholarship, approaching these two issues (primarily) from a political perspective not only tends to neglect something significant about the level of ambition in Rorty’s philosophical thinking, but it also misses a possible way of clearing the charge of inconsistency behind his moral motivations.

I argue that we can elevate these debates by approaching them in relation to Rorty’s later turn to philosophy of religion. Rorty believes that what we need moral and spiritual redemption from today is human egotism, and that this redemption is best served by a post-religious, post-philosophical literary culture. My view is that Rortyan ethnocentrism and the private/public split can be engaged afresh when analyzed in terms of this particular ambition. In this paper, I draw out the implications of Rorty’s position in three stages. First, I argue that he offers two modes of redemption from egotism: the modern values of self-creation and solidarity. Second, and against common interpretations of these traditionally conflicting moral ideals, I contend that both are based on the virtue of self-enlargement in Rorty’s literary culture. Third, I show that the renewed emphasis on self-enlargement reveals a way of dissolving criticisms behind the political offensiveness of Rorty’s ethnocentrism and the indefensibility of his private/public distinction. Motivated by this redemptive, self-expanding feature that fuses Rorty’s ideals of self-creation and solidarity, my conclusion is that his political project can be re-read as consistent through and through.

Communicability and Common Sense: Feminist Appropriations of Arendt’s Work on Judgment
SARAH LUCAS

How should feminists make and validate judgments, especially judgments about what is harmful for women? Hannah Arendt’s late-in-life work on judgment has been taken up by several feminists as a model for conceptualizing a contextualized, intersubjective way to make judgments (Benhabib, 1992; Disch, 1994; Nedelsky, 2001; Zerilli, 2005 and 2009; Fulfer 2014). In this paper, I offer a brief overview of Arendt’s endorsement of the practice of “enlarged thinking” as a part of judgment. I then look at Linda Zerilli’s appropriation of this part of Arendt’s work into a feminist theory of judgment. I argue that Zerilli’s feminist theory of judgment falls short for two reasons: first, it relies on too strong an endorsement of our capacity to judge
beyond our prejudices and, second, it underestimates the importance of communicability as a precondition for the articulation of a judgment. I argue that Seyla Benhabib, by her careful analysis of some of the seeming contradictions in Arendt’s incomplete account of judgment and by her insistence that there is a moral aspect to judgment-making, is able to construct a more satisfying feminist theory of judgment, one which prioritizes communicability and mutual recognition. Finally, I argue that a theory of judgment which emphasizes mutually respectful conversation between narrative agents is the most productive for feminist political philosophy.

**Pathologised Modernity and the End of History**
**SIMON LUMSDEN**

Hegel claims that the defining attribute of Spirit is its capacity for self-production. Modernity is characterised by the emerging and widespread knowledge that Spirit is self-producing. Modernity develops institutional forms that facilitate and provide an objective reality for Spirit’s self-production. This paper examines if the distinctive capacity of Spirit for self-determination, which is realised in modernity, is subject to the same atrophying conditions by which Hegel says all other historical shapes of Spirit are characterized. It asks if the present ecological crisis represent the limits of self-producing Spirit and with it thereby the end of history.

**In/coherent Foucault: The Debate between the Coherence and Non-coherence Theorists**
**WENDYL LUNA**

By identifying himself in some of his later writings as a certain type of “Kantian”, Foucault makes himself appear contradictory and inconsistent, given his criticisms of Kant in the early part of his philosophical career. Foucault’s later pronouncement causes division among his supporters and critics. Critics such as Habermas and Fraser, whom we can call “non-coherence theorists”, find an inherent contradiction in Foucault’s thinking. However, others like Allen and Hendricks, whom we can call “coherence theorists”, claim that Foucault’s criticism of the Kantian critique and the project of Enlightenment is not a total rejection of them but only an “immanent critique”. They find no contradiction but a coherence in Foucault’s philosophy. In this paper, I defend the position of the coherence theorists and present arguments as to why their position is more justifiable, despite Foucault’s apparent discrepancy in his reception of Kant.

To do this, I will firstly give a brief overview of Foucault’s ambiguous position with regard to Kant. Secondly, I will outline the debate between the coherence and non-coherence theorists. Lastly, I will explain why the coherence theorists are
correct. One reason why their position is more justifiable is that from the very beginning Foucault already sought to transform some aspects of Kant’s philosophy. There may be twists and turns in Foucault’s philosophical itinerary, but they should not hinder us from seeing the consistency of his thought. Moreover, Foucault’s entire corpus may be seen as a re-conceptualization of the Kantian critique. Foucault’s “archaeologico-genealogical critique” can be considered as a way of rethinking the Kantian critique. This paper then further validates and strengthens the position of the coherence theorists.

**On Brain-Cels: Animation, Cognition, Deleuze and Stand Alone Complex(es)**
PHILIP MARTIN

*Ghost in the Shell* (Oshii Mamoru 1995) is particularly well-known as a philosophical anime exploring common themes in philosophy of mind, but comparatively little attention is paid to its numerous partner series, such as *Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex* (Kamiyama Kenji 2002-2006). *Ghost in the Shell* follows a special forces unit and the crimes they investigate and is set in a future when bodies are often partial cyborgs and brains can be digitised—allowing for an almost complete detachment of mind and body. *Stand Alone Complex*, set in a parallel world to its predecessor, explores a vastly different conception of minds, brains, bodies and individuals despite using similar narrative, aesthetic and technical resources. Drawing on Thomas Lamarre and Daniel Yacavone to understand how the aesthetic and technical properties of anime and film can create a philosophically active world which highlights a certain technological condition, alongside Deleuzean formulations of individuation, sensation and cinematic time, I will explore the ways in which the relations between the brain, the digital, and the body develop in *Stand Alone Complex*. Intricate relations arise between cognitive extension and digitisation, affectivity and image-production, internality and externality, and differentiation and replication. My contention will be that the way these themes are expressed through the anime—how the anime engages in the activity of philosophy—can help us to rethink some of the ways cognitive philosophy is understood, particularly with respect to digital technology.

**Memory and Imagination in Memoir Writing**
MARTIN BECK MATUŠTIK

What is the relation between memory and imagination in memoir writing? As there are no value-free facts for humans to know, so there is no memory available to us simply as an archive of stored facts. If remembering is laden with imagination, so memorialization (traumatic, reparatory, celebratory) is also countermemory
(imagining the past otherwise) and postmemory (responding to events one has never experienced). In repair and healing of memories one imagines that things, events, and people could be otherwise than they have been. Nietzsche demands the right to forget the past (not to suffer its wounds or atone for its harms) so that one acquires historical and personal innocence. Yet one of the most creative acts of memory is not only our ability to forget but also to forgive or unforgive the past. Benjamin insists against Horkheimer that the past is not past: we expect the future generations to change our present. To refuse forgiveness is to freeze the past as if it could not be reimagined (“we shall never forget ...”). To forgive the past is to change the traumatic scene as if it could be redeemed in the future. One beholds the past without melancholy regret, yet without forgetting the suffering that mourns. In this imaginary turning of memory, new beginnings are created.

Whether one writes memoirs for personal growth or as a public act of transgenerational repair, active remembering and forgetting require imagination. The difference between biography, therapy, and art is less about sorting out facts from fiction and more about the uses and abuses of imagination to fashion truths and of memory to imagine future. One always recollects forward in anamnestic solidarity with the victims of history and one always imagines other future presents. The struggle over memory and imagination is one of the great cataclysms of our times.

**Capitalism and Ethics in A Thousand Plateaus**  
SCOTT MCBRIDE

Many commentators treat Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* as a either a toolbox of specific, separable analyses made with novel concepts, and/or a general ontology of universally applicable types. When treated as a tool box any plateau or sub-set of plateaus can be disconnected and used on their own as one sees fit. When treated as a universal system the particularity of the subject matter is irrelevant to the system as a whole. By their nature, such approaches under-emphasize the internal continuities of the plateaus as a set, as well as downplaying the need for understanding and accounting for the particular selection of case studies and concepts that Deleuze and Guattari made.

I sketch an experimental reading of *A Thousand Plateaus* orientated to continuities and made with an eye to being able to ask and answer ‘why this as an example or a concept, not that?’. Through this lens a different view emerges. In it the account of capitalism is both an organising principle of the work as well as the most promising and detailed site of engagement with ethics for a Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy.
Intuition is mysterious and vague at best. Regardless of the discipline in which it plays an epistemological role, intuition often seems to be ‘the elephant in the room’ when reason and certainty are its knowledge counterparts.

In the phenomenology of Husserl, intuition plays a significant part in the seeing of objects “given originarily” (selbst gegeben) as they appear to us in the flesh, and in the seizing of essences through eidetic seeing (Wesenserschauung). Both intuition and intentional acts are correlate processes in simple perception, and the sole means for arriving at evidence.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl closely and distinctively analyses the correlate ‘intuition and intention’ in terms of the “meaning fulfillment” (and “frustration” of unfulfillment) in different kinds of acts (LI, VI). By his transcendental turn of 1913, Husserl complexifies intentionality with the introduction of the “noetic-noematic” structure in tandem with his phenomenological method comprised of the phenomenological (epoché) and eidetic reductions. In correlative terms, intuition, like intentionality, underwent a methodological transition within the Ideas of 1913, raising many questions not explicitly answered by Husserl.

The purpose of this paper is to closely consider the transitioned role of intuition in Husserl’s Ideas, and to further consider this in relation to a phenomenology of religious experience. The paper will “highlight” how a more nuanced understanding of intuition in correlation to a more refined sense of intentionality (previously and elsewhere argued), can first of all reinstate Husserl as a phenomenologist of religion to challenge French authors of the theological turn who erroneously deem limits to his philosophy: Levinas, Marion and Janicaud; and to second, demonstrate that evidence within religious experience can be sought through a phenomenological examination of the constituted-constituting structures of faith, rather than making any onto-theological claims about the existence of God(s).

Ethics and Ontology. The Moral Phenomenology of Charles Taylor
MICHIEL MEIJER

What do our ethical views commit us to ontologically? Charles Taylor’s answer is that we have to respond at least to the following challenge: either we correct our (implicit) naturalist ontology or we must revise the most salient features of our moral experience. Taylor claims that a naturalist perspective is commonplace in Western culture—that there is no difference in principle between human agents and any other living organisms in nature, and that, therefore, morality is best explained
in physical terms. His criticism is that this naturalist ontology annihilates our sense of morality in its very meaning, that is, the sense that moral values are in some way different, higher, or incommensurable with natural desires.

In response, Taylor proposes a phenomenology of moral experience that recognizes the difference between human nature and mere physical nature. I argue that his position is best understood as a phenomenology with ethical and ontological implications. That is, he evokes basic moral experiences to argue that we cannot make sense of morality without recognizing certain ontological commitments at the same time. This causes a central tension: How to align Taylor’s initial phenomenological starting point, which departs from introspection, with his claims about the ontology outside our moral experience? And what, if anything, are we committed to ontologically by Taylor’s moral phenomenology?

The contribution of this paper is, first, to explore the potential of Taylor’s phenomenological approach to ethics. Second, it makes the case for a tension between moral-phenomenological and ontological claims within Taylor’s writings. Third, this way of conceptually carving up Taylor’s rich philosophical thought not only enables us to comprehend its different dimensions; it also raises the question of their relationship and the metaphysical status of Taylor’s ontological view.

**Standing in the Broom Closet: An analysis of Autonomy and Freedom in The Stanley Parable**

LIAM MILLER

*The Stanley Parable* (TSP) is a video game that offers a unique experience. More of an interactive narrative, TSP follows the story of a generic office worker named Stanley. Stanley’s sole companion is The Narrator, who carries the story along by narrating what Stanley ought to do at each point in the game. As the player, you can choose to either follow The Narrators’ directions or not. This presents the player with the illusion of choice.

It becomes apparent that, no matter what the player chooses to do in the game, it will always restart to the beginning. Each different choice will lead through different paths, but they all end up in the same place. Even quitting the game gets the same outcome. TSP presents us with an interactive model for examining free will and autonomy. While the illusion of a free choice fades quickly when playing, the player still seeks out a way to control or understand the world in which they are acting. It becomes clear that the only thing that the player can control is which story they experience, not what will happen or how it will end. I argue that this experience opens up the possibility for autonomy; not free action, but an understanding of the self who acts. The culmination of this understanding comes when the player enters the broom closet, a small room in the game that does not progress the story in any
way, but does not result in an end state either. It is the one point in the game that no control is asserted on the Stanley, and therefore the player. I will use my analysis of The Stanley Parable to discuss the possibilities of freedom and autonomy on the real world.

Biopolitics and reproduction
CATHERINE MILLS

There has been surprisingly little discussion in contemporary biopolitics literature of the role that reproduction plays in the extension and maintenance of the biopolitical management of life. This lack of discussion is surprising since, as I will argue, reproduction is central to the operation of biopolitics. Fortunately, the obfuscation of the relations between reproduction and biopolitics appears to be changing, with feminist scholars in particular increasingly engaging with questions of reproduction as they pertain to theories of biopolitics, and vice versa. This is at least partly due to the fact that the contemporary politics and practices of reproduction are increasingly subject to risk, uncertainty and the neoliberal commodification of life processes. In this paper, I aim to extend this recent critical engagement between biopolitics and feminism in a theoretical direction. I will briefly examine the way that reproduction has been discussed (or not) in biopolitical theory to date, and, more importantly, begin to address the question of what an account of biopolitics that takes reproduction — and hence sexual difference — seriously would look like. I suggest that such an account would need to do (at least) two things: first, reconsider the emergence of the biopolitical state in light of feminist critiques of the patriarchal foundations of Western politics; and second, approach the reconceptualization of life through the matrix of sexual difference, which itself must be understood as both a fundamental feature of life, and an effect of the biopolitical constitution and management of it.

Sensing the interrelationality of legein and logos: The ground of an intersubjective ethics in education
PATRICIA MORGAN

This presentation examines a pre-figurative ground of language and motility that can be sensed in a space Martin Heidegger describes as the “between of hearing and speaking” (Heidegger in Ziarek, 1994, p. 35). I suggest this elemental substrate is important in engaging ethics implicit in the educational relationship because of the correspondence between the interrelationality of this relationship and the form of Heidegger’s pre-ontological ground. An understanding of this starts with Heidegger’s retrieval of an original interpretation of logos and legein beyond the conventional definitions of logos as ‘speech’ and legein the corresponding verb ‘to
speak’. Heidegger returns to what he claims are their Greek origins, with legein meaning to gather together and lay forth and logos the primordial substrate of this process. His re-reading provides for the interrelationality of their form and processes, though Heidegger suggests that a ‘phenomenologically vigilant’ awareness is required to perceive both. I look to the reemergence of a contemplative orientation in education currently providing the means to perceive the legein at work in the logos. This in turn increases the ability to discern the intersubjectivity of the educational relationship. Having a more direct access to these relational realms then highlights questions of ethics. Particularly, what are the essential factors required when developing pedagogy that elicits increased intersubjective or second-person awareness? After outlining Heidegger’s thesis of a primordial (interrelational) substrate I answer this question by introducing Christian de Quincy’s (2000) delineation of intersubjective experience and propositions for an ‘intersubjective ethics’ from the educational philosophers Sharon Todd (2001), Heesoon Bai (2004) and Clifford Mayes (2002).

Φύσις on Film? Heidegger, Art, and the Question of the Cinematic Manifestation of Being
MICHAEL MOSELEY

Martin Heidegger is not a figure whose thought features prominently in the burgeoning field of philosophical studies of cinema. When his philosophy is considered, it is for the most part in relation to the films of Terrence Malick, a one time Heidegger scholar. Critics have made the bold assertion that Malick’s films can be understood to ‘do’ Heideggerian philosophy, but many of these studies do not live up to this claim. Heidegger’s question of Being is often interpreted ontically, his (mainly critical) comments on film ignored, and also ignored, or interpreted superficially, is his understanding of art. Such an engagement with Heidegger is insufficient for the label ‘Heideggerian cinema’. The present study seeks to engage with Heidegger’s philosophy more thoroughly, arguing that for Heidegger art manifests Being in its withdrawal, and that cinema is excluded from the realm of art for Heidegger on the basis of the realism of its image. To explore how despite the realism of the film-photographic image cinema may be understood to function as Heideggerian art, Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1962 film L’eclisse is considered with a focus on Antonioni’s use ‘dead time’.

This approach is commended not just out of fidelity to Heidegger’s writings, but also in order to understand the implications for Heidegger’s philosophy for the field of philosophy and film. Like Cavell and Deleuze, Heidegger saw modernity as beset by nihilism, only Heidegger’s nihilism is a nihilism of Being, and unless the importance of Being in Heidegger’s philosophy, and the importance of art as the
manifestation of Being is understood, then the potential for dialogue between these thinkers is obscured. Heidegger is also critical of the cognitivist approach to art as it mistakes entirely art’s nature. As such, Heidegger’s thought could in the future function as a critique of the cognitivist philosophy of film.

A madman, a black man and a Jewish woman go to a conference—but ‘the king stay the king’

BRYAN MUKANDI

This paper revolves around the chess scene in ‘The Buys’, the third episode of the first season of the television series, The Wire. I claim that the scene can be read as a vignette into the logic or architecture of not only the entire series, but the social structure of oppression more broadly. I explore the idea that ‘the king stay the king’ through a reading of the correspondence between Antonin Artaud, a madman, and Jacques Rivi—re; suggesting that the former’s madness inheres in his refusal to pay fealty to ‘the king’. I then question the implications of this structure or logic for philosophy. Frantz Fanon, a black man, is my case in point. I read his ‘The Lived Experience of the Black’ alongside the Artaud-Rivière correspondence in order to highlight the cost of insufficiently submitting to the authority of the sovereign. Based on my reading of Cioran’s claim that those who ‘do philosophy’—who submit to the laws or rule of philosophy—are healthy, while those who think are sick, I question the bounds of intelligible discourse within academic philosophy. Given her views on thinking as that which arrests and paralyses, I substantiate the legitimacy of my question by drawing Hannah Arendt, a Jewish woman, into my argument, then conclude with a series of questions: if ‘the king stay the king’, could philosophy be inimical to thought; how hospitable is academic philosophy to the sick; if you were to witness the poetry of Artaud, the weeping of Fanon or Arendt thinking today, would you deport, incarcerate or just not recognise them?

Being-Object/Subject: Casting Anew the Ontological Violence of Racism.

HELEN NGO

"I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects." (Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, 1967: 109)

The language of objecthood is often invoked in critical race and post-colonial discourse, and for good reason: it expresses the profound dispossession and de-subjectification of the colonial and racist experience. Analyses of the racist gaze in Fanon and Sartre, for example, show how racialised bodies are reduced to a kind of
being-object through the constituting power of the gaze. And yet, while this does important work in naming the violence of white racism, to what extent do the terms of this discourse re-inscribe a subject-object ontology that various philosophical efforts have sought to overcome? After all, the racialised body is seen, but also sees itself being seen; racialised embodiment entails a concomitant being-subject-and-object. In this paper I turn to the resources of phenomenology, which can offer us various ways for thinking relationality in the lived body. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s account of flesh ontology and the chiasm, I argue that there is an important sense in which we are all co-constituted by others (places, and things). But this need not diminish the weight of claims regarding racial objectification, rather, it offers us the occasion to cast anew the ontological violence of racism: a violence not of one’s subjectivity as commonly argued, but a more urgent and profound violence of intersubjectivity.

**Wasted Seasons: Canguilhem’s New Old Hyperbole Of A Quarrel To Come**

RETO OECHSLIN

Georges Canguilhem turned the pages of philosophy by giving its hyperbole a face. However obscurity plagues his rationalist warrants, fuelling paradoxically the questioned hyperbole. Unintentionally he compromised his project, which contributes still today to the methodological conundrum. Hence there is a fine line between critique and critique, one renews the other doesn’t. I try to find answers to why intersectional warrants turn into fallacies; where Canguilhem’s and his successors’ warrants appear as being wasted in ‘seasons’. Through logical loopholes, Canguilhem’s new old twofold hyperbole is yet significant how it predicted corrections to come, in a futureless future.

Through a methodological triangulation, between Canguilhem’s hyperbole, precursor(s) and current warrants it can be revealed how the functional curiosity varies considerably between authors, yet with a common methodological ground, which should alert of recurrent fallacies. Canguilhem’s rationalist anti-functionalism intercepted structural-methodological contradictions, and urged for deeper debates. Yet both aspects are affected by hermeneutical legacies, particularly in intersectional warrants. Epistemological motives dominate in the first and ontological in the second. The funnelled trend of preoccupations confirms as well his predictions concerning synthetic quarrels, where the current residual resistant thinking testifies essentially too this situation.

While Canguilhem’s resistant project addressed the methodological conundrum, importantly, he reminded at the reincarnating forces of resistant methodologies, where he pressed rationalist resistance into a kind of synthetic
moratorium and which allowed him to display the controversial auto-exhausting aspect of rationalist critique. With confirming the importance of methodology and by warranting hyperbolically loopholes, paradoxically, the functional resistance tends effectively to convert into a hyper format that can demonstrate how warrants commute from dialectical backgrounds. Although warrants form a part of the investigation of the methodological-hermeneutical conundrum today, and yet, these are perhaps less unresolved than estimated; which could be the reason why warrants are regularly catapulted into fallacy orbits.

**Nietzsche and Virtue Ethics**

**ANDRE OKAWARA**

While it is true that the revival of virtue ethics has allowed a deeper engagement with Nietzsche’s positive ethics, the variety of accounts so produced is an indication that more work is needed to advance our understanding of the relationship between virtue ethics and Nietzsche’s philosophy. Given the comparable structures of Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s ethics it is unsurprising that, along with Christine Swanton’s pluralistic interpretation, eudaimonist and naturalist accounts of Nietzschean virtues have been suggested. Each of these accounts recognises the affinities between Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and some of Nietzsche’s views. I examine elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy that lend themselves to comparison with traditional accounts of virtue, eudaimonia, human nature, and practical wisdom. In doing so, I identify what is unique in Nietzsche’s conception of such elements and make suggestions about what role they can play in reconstructions of his ethics.

**Can Love be Excessive? Baumgarten and Kant on the Relationship between Love and Respect**

**TOSHIRO OSAWA**

In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant conceives of the relationship between love and respect in the moral world by analogy with the relationship between attraction and repulsion in the physical world (MS 6:449). In terms of the latter relationship, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant explains that both attraction and repulsion are originally inherent in matter itself, and that the ‘dynamical’ path in the procedure of natural philosophy, as opposed to the ‘mechanical’ path, is defined by the consideration of the combination of forces of attraction and repulsion in its variety (MAN 4:532). Given that Kant is well aware of the analogy between the moral and physical world(s), what does his explanation of the relationship between attraction and repulsion imply for his moral philosophy presented in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’? How does Kant explain the
dynamics of the relationship between love and respect? I argue that Kant’s conception of the relationship between love and respect is structured as a result of his rejection of the concept of friendship as formulated by Baumgarten, which Kant thinks allows love to be ‘excessive’ being unregulated by respect. This rejection of Baumgarten’s conception of friendship must be understood against the backdrop of Kant’s persistent criticism of Baumgarten’s moral imperative “perfect yourself” (Ethica philosophica e10), which Baumgarten thinks must be applied to all of our moral obligations (duties of perfection of oneself and others). Kant, however, considers this imperative to require re-examination in terms of the boundaries of duties.

**Back to the Future: Accelerationism's Modernisms**

MONTE PEMBERTON

Drawing on a range of 19th and 20th century philosophy (for example, Marx’s critique of economics, Lyotard’s libidinal economy, Baudrillard’s pataphysics, Deleuze and Guttari’s de- and re-territorialization, and Nick Land’s cyberculture) accelerationism proposes that capitalism, insofar as it is a system that inhibits human freedom, is best dealt with by embracing it properly, or as the name suggests, by speeding it up.

Thus the accelerationist strategy runs contrary to conventional strategies such as trying to slow capitalism down or to retreating from economic or material ‘progress’ altogether. This is because accelerationists generally perceive that, in one way or another, the natural evolution of capitalism is itself being retarded by forces and agencies that are not as capitalistic as they appear and/or are an impediment to the achievement of human happiness. Accelerationists, it could be said, are willing to make good Marx’s perception that things are going to have to get worse before they get better.

This is a vivid example of the contemporary political imaginary, to be sure. But in practical terms, what does accelerationism mean? Emphases abound; there are perhaps as many approaches as there are accelerationists: as the above names suggest, the creation of political fictions and stories, the liberation of markets, the embrace of the pleasure of speed and the decentralization of the subject, and the exploitation of technology are a few notable categories of possibilities.

Despite their apparent diversity and radical postures, these various routes to the future are subtended by some well consolidated modernist themes concerning the nature of time and the potential of technology. With this in mind, this talk appraises accelerationism on the basis of its repackaging of a modernist perspective into post-modern potential.
The Kantian Trial Separation in German Aesthetics’ Marriage of Truth and Beauty
JAMES PHILLIPS

This paper considers the background to Kant’s handling of aesthetic and cognitive judgement in the third Critique. With his distinction between aesthetic and cognitive judgement, Kant introduces a distance between truth and beauty alien to the predominant school of eighteenth-century German aesthetics. In his appropriation of different eighteenth-century approaches to aesthetics, Kant could be described as trying to mediate between the intellectualism of Wolff and Baumgarten and the psychologism of French and British thinkers—alternatively, he could be said to temper the intellectualism of his German predecessors while also pushing beyond the merely subjective import that a writer such as Burke finds in the beautiful and the sublime. I want to argue that there is an irony in the reception of the third Critique by its first readers, since the very means by which Kant qualifies and restrains the intellectualism of earlier German aesthetics are crucial to Schiller, Schelling and Hegel in their reassertion of the bond between truth and beauty.

Walter Benjamin’s Ontology Of Art
ALEXEI PROCYSHYN

I offer a reconstruction of Walter Benjamin’s ontology of art, showing that it remains fairly stable across his oeuvre. Drawing on “Two Poems by Hölderlin,” “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” “On the Image of Proust,” and “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,” I show that Benjamin conceives of artworks as expressive limit-phenomena which present the guiding values of their historical situation and open up the possibility of re-schematizing (transforming) it, thereby generating new potentials for action without dictating a determinate view about artistic meaning or content.

I begin my reconstruction by focusing on Benjamin’s notions of ‘material content’ and ‘truth-content.’ I argue that ‘material content’ retools what Benjamin initially described as an artwork’s manner of bearing witness to a world in “Two Poems,” and stands for the aesthetic presentation of an epoch’s constitutive and orienting values. Benjamin’s ‘truth content’ in turn leverages the idea that artworks express historically situated values into a critical insight: since values remain relative, artworks invite and support re-schematization in light of new values orientations and hence are generative of new action potentials. On the basis of this reconstruction, I show how this polarized conception of art informs Benjamin’s conception of image and his more polemical discussion of the nature of art and its social situation in the “Work of Art” essay. The expression of constitutive values and the normative transvaluation potentials implicit in the very nature of art explain the
sociological and political inflections of Benjamin’s aesthetics. I conclude with a clarification of Benjamin’s often-misunderstood claim concerning the aesthetization of politics and the politicization of art

**Neoliberal Capitalism, ASEAN Integration and Commodified Education: A Deleuzian Critique**
RANIEL REYES

This paper is a Deleuzian critique of neoliberal capitalism through the lens of the ASEAN Integration Project. I will flesh out my critical diagnosis by expounding on capitalism’s effects to the University in general and to Philippine Higher Education in particular. The panoptical supremacy of neoliberal capitalist organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organizations in the South East Asian Region is amplified by the ASEAN Integration phenomenon. The capitalist strategists of this project, which Deleuze and Guattari call the “poor technician of desire” persuade underdeveloped countries and developing countries such as the Philippines, that their deficiency in financial stability or in the latest education reform, for instance, is a “lack” which requires immediate attention and solution. These so-called experts popularize the global call for liberalization, deregulation and privatization as the only solutions to their problems. When this psychoanalytic ploy achieves success, these countries become naive preys of neoliberal capitalism. In the book *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they interpret this phenomenon as a contemporary fascism that manipulates the people to desire for increased order, unity and their own repression. As a counter to this system, they formulate the concept of “schizoanalysis.” It is a radical philosophy that seeks for the evisceration of psychoanalytic capitalism which creatively imposes neurosis and regulates the preservation of its Oedipal relation to its victims. Schizoanalysis aims for the differential participation and performance between the analyst and the analysand, in such a manner that non-unitarian and non-commodified relations, as well as rhizomic connections are to be fashioned. Lastly, I will use schizoanalysis to diagram a Deleuzian philosophy of education or becoming-revolutionary in education.

**The perdurance of phenomenology: contra Meillassoux, Brassier, etc.**
JACK REYNOLDS

This paper will take up Ray Brassier’s and Quentin Meillassoux’s now well-known critiques of phenomenology, with the aim being to show the perdurance of phenomenology—both its inescapability but also its desirability for philosophy today. It will do this in two ways, firstly by calling into question the versions of scientific realism committed to by each, and secondly by seeking to develop a
conception of phenomenology in dialogue with the relevant sciences that is not subject to the terms of their respective critiques. I will argue, however, that defences of phenomenology in terms of instrumentalist/constructive empiricist accounts of science is not the way to go.

Representing A Radical Intersectional Feminine Subjectivity: Luce Irigaray and Céline Sciamma’s Girlhood
LAURA ROBERTS

Using Céline Sciamma’s 2014 film Girlhood this paper explores Luce Irigaray’s call for positive representations of feminine subjectivity in the Western symbolic. I provide a brief overview of Irigaray’s demand for the recognition of a non-hierarchical sexuate difference in order to contextualise her call for the creation of positive representations of autonomous feminine subjectivity. I use Lucy Bolton’s work to illustrate the connections between Irigaray’s writings on feminine subjectivity and film. Following Bolton, I suggest that Irigaray’s work on autonomous feminine subjectivity provides a useful lens through which to consider the representation of women in film. Using this framework I argue that Girlhood provides an excellent example of what positive representations of feminine subjectivity might look like. This paper investigates the way in which Girlhood represents the tensions (internal and socio-political) of an autonomous feminine subjectivity and, in doing so, highlights many Irigarayian themes regarding relations between women and relations between men and women. I argue that this film disturbs many stereotypical tropes of gender and when viewed via the lens of Irigaray’s double-pronged approach, her critical and creative aspects, we can read this as a coming of age film as well as a critical political moment in the journey toward undoing troubling patriarchal stereotypes of women. Furthermore, the ways in which gender, class, race and themes of postcoloniality intersect in this film demonstrate the ways in which we can take Irigaray’s comments on the relations between gender, race and ethnicity seriously. This film provides an opportunity for thinking about the relations between the philosophy of sexuate difference and the way in which this philosophy contributes to a radical intersectional feminine subjectivity in ways that are yet to be appreciated by Irigarayian scholars, as well as within the broader contexts of feminist philosophy, and the contemporary philosophical tradition at large.

How Reality Television Displaces Creativity
CARLA ROCÁVERT

This paper examines the relationship between reality television and creativity in the 21st century from the combined perspectives of art theory and hermeneutic
philosophy. Reality television is analysed as a phenomenon built on contradiction—one that purports to convey the real but inherently works against its own character as unreality. The genre comes into question not only for its unethical capitalization of Schadenfreude, humiliation and sensationalism, but also for the way it distances us from critical understandings achieved through art. In hermeneutic terms, it will be argued that ‘reality’ obstructs the truth that comes with genuine imagination, the dialogical conditions of play, and our engagement with the unity and integrity of the other.

Furthermore, if creativity, now largely appropriated to the globalized, neoliberal realm, can be identified in the 'gamification' of Kardashians in a virtual Hollywood, or in a financial product or terrorist event, what are the broader social, economic and cultural implications? By questioning the effusive positivity that surrounds the rising creative class and creative economy, this paper draws attention to the role of reality television—a highly illuminating commercial phenomenon.

How to Read Nietzsche's Anti-Christ
DAVID ROWE

In Section 1 of Anti-Christ, Nietzsche implores us—we ‘Hyperboreans’—to ‘travel’ a new road. He formulates a ‘new goal’ for our happiness. He then introduces the increasing of power as a principle of this re-evaluation (Section 2), before highlighting the problem he is concerned with, namely ‘what type of human being ought to be [bred and willed]’ (Section 3). He makes a distinction between progress (i.e. in terms of science, technology, modernization, liberty, democracy, quality of life, etc.) and betterment (e.g. qualitatively better humankind) (Section 4) and states the argument of Anti-Christ in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 5 he opposes the ‘weak’ instincts of Christianity with the ‘preservative instincts of strong life’ and explicitly states his intended conclusion in Section 6, namely ‘that all the values in which mankind at present summarizes its highest desideratum are décadence values’. Décadence, for Nietzsche, signifies a disgregation of the will or instincts. As will or instincts provide one with one’s evaluative perspective, ‘décadence values’ are those values which are a result of a kind of defective ‘evaluative orientation-giving’ by the instincts or will. This evaluative orientation is one’s instinct’s voice or, as Nietzsche says in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, one’s will to power: “A table of values hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power.” (Z I 15)

I argue that this is the argument that Nietzsche pursues throughout the totality of Anti-Christ. The Anti-Christ is thus both descriptive and polemic. It is descriptive insofar as Nietzsche marshals historical evidence, along with his principle of re-evaluation, for his conclusion that the highest of all values are
décadence values; it is polemic insofar as Nietzsche offers a denouncing of these values in light of the values of the strong (cf. GM Preface, 6). I offer this as a superior interpretation of Anti-Christ

The struggle for recognition in the theatre of politics
MATHÉSON RUSSELL

Deliberative democrats tend to argue that fruitful political debate requires that participants show each other mutual respect and afford each other equal rights of participation. In this paper, I offer a heterodox analysis of political disagreement as a context in which speakers argue not only about what is right or true but also about their standing as equals or as rational beings. On this model, argumentative discourse does not involve or require a “presupposition of rationality” (contra Habermas) but is rather a “theatre” in which speakers vie for recognition as rational, trustworthy, or authoritative. What makes a disagreement “political” on this account is not so much that it concerns public policy as that it concerns how the participants will be judged as participants in social interaction. In the theatre of politics, speech is the medium in which individuals enter into a competition for the better argument and by the same token seek to demonstrate their superior capacities as agents and show up the deficiencies of their opponents. I argue that by taking notice of this higher level of “contingency” at play in the political disagreement (concerning the standing of the interlocutors) we can begin to understand the ways in which language is used in the public sphere to negotiate basic questions of social order, trust and legitimacy.

Effects of “Phantasmatic Truth”: On Jacques Derrida’s The Death Penalty and Reading of Albert Camus
CAROLINE SHEAFFER-JONES

In Jacques Derrida’s wide-ranging analysis of the question of the death penalty (The Death Penalty, Volume I), there is a crucial discussion of Albert Camus’ publications on this issue, including Reflections on the Guillotine and The Outsider. While both writers support abolitionist positions, each opposing talionic law, justice as vengeance and the calculating decision of the death penalty, Derrida appears not to recognise that his conceptualisation of the problem is perhaps closer to that of Camus than he might imagine. In short, in a radical questioning of the history of civilisation, Derrida would in a sense move beyond two types of abolitionism which he identifies: one an essentially Christian force such as represented by Victor Hugo and the other a secular, “immanentist humanism,” such as in Camus’ standpoint. However, Camus’ position exceeds Derrida’s classification of it as “immanentist humanism,” particularly if Camus’ major text, The Rebel, only mentioned in passing,
is considered. Most importantly, what is apparent is that there are indeed greater affinities between Camus’ writings and Derrida’s complex conceptualisation of the death penalty, notably in relation to the wider perspective of what J. Hillis Miller has called “Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity” (For Derrida, NY: Fordham U.P., 2009, 222-244).

**Kant and the Form of Community**
MAX SIPOWICZ

In the *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* Kant argued that “The greatest problem for the human species, to which nature compels him, is the achievement of a civil society universally administering right” since “only in society can the highest aim of nature be attained, namely, the development of all the predispositions in humanity” (IH 8:22). In other words, the problem faced by humanity is the formation of a community that could enable humanity to progress towards the development of its predispositions.

This essay aims to analyze what Kant meant by community and how it can lead to the development of human beings. It will be argued that there are two kinds of community with which Kant was particularly concerned. The first is the actual political community, i.e., the State. The second is the community of judgment, i.e., the community referred to by the *Sensus Communis*. Typically there are two interpretations of Kant’s intention for the State. That is that it is perfected either as a representational democracy, or that it is an enlightened absolutist regime. Through the development of the concept of the *Sensus Communis*, this paper will trace a third option, that of self-legislation (*autarchea*).

**Reassessing Adorno’s critique of Stravinsky’s *Le Sacre du printemps* through the lens of the lived, transformative body**
RHONDA SIU

In *Philosophy of Modern Music*, Theodor Adorno critiques Stravinsky’s music for what he perceives as its lack of transformative potential. Adorno claims that Objectivist composers like Stravinsky detach their music from social conundrums by employing musical forms that are erroneously assumed to remain static over time. For Adorno, this absence of transformation is exemplified in Stravinsky’s controversial work, *Le Sacre du printemps*. This ballet depicts a pagan rite wherein an individual is sacrificed so that the remaining tribe members can be subsequently protected from the wrath of the God of Spring.

Stravinsky, Adorno argues, fails to shape/transform the musical material in such a way that exposes the cruelty suffered by the victim. Rather, Adorno believes that Stravinsky’s primitive music simply exercises its power over the
listener/dancer/instrumentalist in an equally uncompromising manner as the tribe exercises its power over the victim. For Adorno, central to this coercive system is Stravinsky’s harsh treatment of the human body. Specifically, the music becomes an unyielding force that compels the dancers’/instrumentalists’ bodies to perform at their utmost level of technical skill.

Against Adorno, this paper offers an alternative interpretation of Stravinsky’s *Sacre* by suggesting instead that this work is transformative. The lived body, I argue, is precisely the locus of *Sacre*’s transformative potential. During performances of this work, various interpretations emerge, and are created, through the music’s ability to affect and transform the bodies of the conductor, instrumentalists, listeners and dancers in diverse ways. For example, while one performer’s body may primarily express the pain of human sacrifice, another’s body may mainly express the victim’s fear and vulnerability. More broadly, such interpretations would also evolve over time according to the wider socio-historical circumstances in which *Sacre* is performed.

**Arendt on the active life**

NICHOLAS SMITH

In *The Human Condition* (1958), Hannah Arendt offers us “a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears”. This requires that we “think what we are doing”, since what we are doing is itself the source of these experiences and fears. In particular, there are experiences and fears that arise from the kind of doing Arendt calls ‘labour’, which she distinguishes from ‘work’ and action’. The main reason that Arendt herself gives for the distinction between labour and work is that the ‘phenomenal evidence’ commands it. In my presentation I reconsider this evidence and find it wanting. But if Arendt’s own attempt at thinking what we are doing when we labour or work falls short, we should follow her in taking the task itself, namely the phenomenology of labour, as central for a philosophical diagnosis of the times.

**The Sophist Body: "The Lost Weekend" and Derrida/Plato’s ‘Pharmakon’**.

RICHARD SMITH

Derrida’s reading of Plato’s *Phaedrus* (and concept of the pharmakon) can be read as a precursor to the current interest in cinematic embodiment. Whereas in current theories of embodiment the “exercise of memory” is often marginal, ignored or submerged in a complex range of somatic and cognitive gestures Derrida’s pharmakon explores in depth the relation of two types of memory linked to speech and writing as embodied gestures. At key points in his discussion (I. 4. *The*
Derrida emphasises the ambivalence, or even reversibility of the two forms, drawing on concepts such as ghost, impostor, surrogate, substitute, “spitting-image”, etc to overturn the rigorous differentiation of inside and outside that Plato seeks to enforce in and through his story of the invention of writing. This paper uses Derrida’s discussion of the pharmakon to work through a film that “embodies” Plato’s epistemological dispute over memory. Billy Wilder’s The Lost Weekend dramatises the problematic of writing through a struggle between anamnesis and hypomnemosis, between two bodily gestures, speech and writing of its central protagonist, writer-drinker Don Birnam. The broader significance of this debate, and this film for film theory is the way it contends with the difficult relation of Weimar cinema and Hollywood cinema, through the dialectic of the body of the writer-drinker. In the end, I will argue the as yet unrecognised value of Wilder’s film is its exploration of what Thomas Elsaesser calls the proletarianisation of writing, its exploration of cinematic gestures as shaped and constrained by Hollywood and the studio system.

Kant, Merleau-Ponty, and the Paradox of Symmetrical Objects
HENRY SOMERS-HALL

At several points in his work, Merleau-Ponty refers to a discussion by Kant of what Merleau-Ponty calls the paradox of symmetrical objects. The argument that arises from this paradox is used by Kant primarily to show a difference in kind between our experience of space, and our conceptual thought by positing the existence of properties of objects that cannot be captured by a purely conceptual description of them. In this paper, I will explore the use Merleau-Ponty makes of this argument to argue for the perspectival nature of experience. I will begin by outlining Kant’s own argument, as well as developing novel connections between this argument and key sections of his essay, ‘What is orientation in thinking?’ where Kant provides a rare phenomenological description of the perspectival nature of existence. Kant’s goal in this essay is to show the necessary foundation in experience of our account of the world. I will show how this argument leads to a refutation of what Merleau-Ponty describes as logicism, before exploring how Merleau-Ponty draws two main corollaries from Kant’s argument: the difference in kind between the structure of perception and the structure of judgement, and the presence of ‘something brute’ in our experience. I will conclude by reconstructing Merleau-Ponty’s argument as to why Kant’s use of the paradox of symmetrical objects is illegitimate. Returning to Kant’s description of our experience of the world in his orientation essay, I will draw on the Visible and the Invisible to show why Kant’s account of experience here is in fact a reflective reconstruction, thus undermining Kant’s own claim to begin with experience itself.
Dasein and Cognition
MARILYN STENDERÁ

In what is by now a familiar turn, recent decades have seen phenomenological perspectives expand the kinds of interactions through which they encounter cognitive science; the former are no longer primarily critics and interrogators of, but also collaborators and co-explorers with, the latter. This enterprise is, of course, not without its detractors; the debate over the in principle feasibility of cooperation between the disciplines has become a discourse in itself. One topic that has attracted significant attention is the role of Heideggerian phenomenology in all this. The prominence of the account of Sein und Zeit in early critical dialogues with cognitive science has led some to posit that its analyses cannot be drawn upon in more amicable, constructive exchanges; others, meanwhile, contend that, on the contrary, there is much potential for and in a ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’. This paper will look at some of the challenges that the latter, more optimistic outlook faces.

Focussing on problems arising from the need to extend the conceptualisation of Dasein when discussing cognition, I will suggest that a cooperation between Heidegger’s framework and contemporary approaches to cognitive science is not only viable but desirable, with the potential to enrich both interlocutors.

Making the Familiar Strange: Critical Theory and the Concept of Habit
CHARLIE STRONG

I will defend the claim that the notion of habit—which is gaining traction in philosophy of mind, mainstream cognitive science, and neuroscience—is best conceptualized in a continental phenomenological and critical theoretical tradition. This matters because mainstream cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and neuroscience cast very large shadows. That is to say, these dominant discourses are positioned in such a way that they are able to more forcefully define and, by fiat, legitimate key anthropological definitions across multiple disciplines.

At present, definitions and subsequent operationalizations of habit have largely been neutralized and stripped of any critical aspects. A better conceptualization of habit is to be found in nascent form in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Extending beyond the level of first-person experience, Pierre Bourdieu offers the resources needed to intervene in these interdisciplinary debates on the nature of habit. These conceptualizations are able to account for the capacities and affordances sought by philosophy of mind and CogSci but have the added virtue of not being stripped of critical considerations, made milquetoast, and formulated as mere feckless functions.

I will begin by very briefly providing evidence of current uses and abuses (by omission and truncation) of habit in philosophy of mind and cognitive science to
make my target clear and to establish that my claim is not a case of tilting at
windmills.

I will then turn to definitions and accounts of habit given by Merleau-Ponty. After which I will show how Pierre Bourdieu retools Merleau-Pontian habit. 

_{L’habitude becomes habitus. Habitus is defined as the natural capacity to acquire non-natural capacities that nevertheless appear natural, obvious, given, and neutral. Habitus is the system of dispositional schemas of action, perception, and apperception that serve to mask as well and perpetuate structures of domination._

**A Community of the Homeless**
**TERRILYN SWEEP**

Heidegger shows us how death individualises, because a human dies a unique death. My death means the expiration of my thrown-being self and all the potentialities that come with that life, which are different to the next person’s. Walter Brogan’s (2002) analysis of this Heideggerian view, particularly in the context of Heidegger’s later work, discusses Heidegger’s commitment to a possible community of singular beings and explains the intrinsic nature of such a community. Briefly, it is one that celebrates the originary sovereignty of the other on account of the fundamentally ungraspable, uncompletable nature of _Dasein_. While acknowledging Brogan’s account, I also reflect on Heidegger’s notion of ‘uncanniness’ and propose that such a community of singular and sovereign beings can arise from the unnerving facticity of existence itself. A thrown-being existence is also individualising on the basis of its particularising, isolating effect of generating a unique, unchosen life scenario for each human being.

**The Contemporary Imaginary and False Continuities of Ryan Trecartin**
**DENISE THWAITES**

“If Facebook had a nightmare, it would look like this”
(Patrick Langley, The White Review)

Contemporary film, or the moving-image more generally, is often discussed as illustrative of new forms of thought. Deleuze’s _Cinema 1_ and _Cinema 2_ provide us with ways to consider the moving-image, not only as a manifestation of new images of thought, but as an affective constituent of human consciousness.

With this in mind, what might be the diagnostic, or prognostic implications of the films and installations of contemporary artist Ryan Trecartin? Described by Gesine Borcherdt as a greedy, cyborgian freakshow, the turbo-charged pastiche and false-continuities of his work, provide fodder for a new philosophical imaginary to grapple with the digital age.
Violence and relational existence: its significance for our experience of confidence, self-trust and distrust
FIONA UTLEY

In Mensch’s phenomenological account of violence, its relationship with embodiment is such that violence corrupts the “I can” and undoes, on multiple levels, what has been created through lived experience. Bringing forward what I read as processes of institution, the corruption is such that what is instituted will bear the hallmarks of the violence that occurs. The significance of such a phenomenological account is emphasized through developing the links to Al-Saji’s work on the rhythm of duration and affectivity’s hesitation, and its significance for the body’s bearing or style, and synchronization as understood by Merleau-Ponty. I explore the following: when confronted by repeated violence, the affective of hesitation is experienced as failure which in turn registers as an inhibition to synchronization, not only with others but the world that is inhabited. This form of delay in synchronization is experienced in subjectivity as an apprehension towards the world that is a particular form of anxiety; synchronization must remain tentative in order to avoid the experience of failure at the same time that delaying synchronization affirms and repeats the sense of failure. I direct this account to the related experiences of confidence and self-trust, as well as the disposition towards distrust.

From Prophecy to Adequate Understanding: The Making of Spinoza’s Ethics
CHRIS VAN ROMPAEY

If Spinoza’s status as a major philosopher rests, as is generally acknowledged, on the Ethics, where does this leave the Theological-Political Treatise? Published anonymously in 1670, after the drafting of the first three parts of the Ethics between 1662 and 1665 but before the private circulation of the completed manuscript in 1675, its genesis is curiously entangled with that of the later text. How, then, should this interrelation be read? With its unique blend of biblical exegesis, political critique and philosophical enquiry, the TTP is, I argue, not simply a preliminary demolition job on religion’s claim to truth but is itself shaped in important respects by the metaphysical schema elaborated in the Ethics.

To demonstrate the interdependence of the two texts the paper will be developed around three key themes. First, the status of prophecy vis-à-vis divine knowledge, second, the relation between God and nature, and finally, the critique, whether implicit or pointedly explicit, of Aristotelianism. Particular emphasis will be given to the figure of the prophet whose function and level of intellectual understanding is arguably the greatest point of difference between Spinoza and the
theologians. The enquiry will be guided by two overriding questions: to what extent does the TTP clear the theological ground, as it were, to make way for the metaphysical radicalism of the Ethics and, conversely, to what extent do the already-formulated propositions of the Ethics provide a theoretical validation of positions adopted in the TTP?

**Seeing Red (and Black): Walter Benjamin on Violence and Ethical Anarchism**  
DIMITRI VOUROS

Georges Sorel, Mikhail Bakunin and Rosa Luxemburg were important influences on the young Walter Benjamin when he was still largely a Neo-Kantian, interested in Romantic literary criticism, and oblivious to the political. Yet with Benjamin’s important essay “Critique of Violence” (1921), and related pieces from the same period, he emerges as a fully engaged political thinker. These early political works are responses to his own reading of Georges Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence* (1908). In Sorel’s book the phenomenon of the mass strike, and its legality, is extrapolated from a non-determinist, Bergsonian position and understanding of temporality and history. This paper will argue that Walter Benjamin wants to employ a juristic framework to argue for a secularised theology of political intervention. It is a form of political thinking which without resorting to solutions issuing from various currents of ‘Lebensphilosophie’ circumvents the ontological-philosophical limitations endemic to both historical materialism and liberal theories of justification. Benjamin’s non-teleological Messianism can be seen as a non-religious, even nihilistic, revision of Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope from the ‘Spirit of Utopia’ (1915-16). Radical change is a question of constituent power, not the projection of an ideal. Democracy issues from a “Messianic violence” which instaurates/regenerates a polity from below by displacing “mythic violence” and “idolatrous” instantiations of the law.

**Birdman (2014) as Baroque Fold, Figure, Form and Flight**  
SAIGE WALTON

In his book *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, Gilles Deleuze detaches the baroque from its historic origins in seventeenth-century Europe to argue for the baroque as trans-historic operative function: the fold to infinity. While Deleuze’s titular guide in this text is Leibniz, this paper will examine how Deleuze’s concept of the fold is also shaped by early art history and the work of Swiss art historian, Heinrich Wölfflin, in particular. As I argue it, Wölfflin’s underutilised and sensuous appreciation of baroque art can be productively read in conjunction with Deleuze to further the film-philosophical implications of the fold.
In re-visiting Deleuze’s dialogue with Wölfflin in *The Fold*, it is the intention of this paper to explore what the architectonic implications of the fold might also mean for a suitably baroque cinema. Concentrating its analyses on the recent *Birdman* (Iñárritu, 2014), this paper will read the film as its own revisionist superhero narrative but one that is inflected by the sensuality of the baroque fold in terms of its embodied aesthetics of perpetual movement, spatialisation and flight. The baroque sensibility and sensuality *Birdman* is best apprehended through the concept of the fold—as a tension between aesthetic form or being that is weighed down by gravity while also possessing an urge to flight that is always in and of immanence.

**Remnants of Auschwitz and Walter Benjamin: 'the art of citing without quotation marks' in the camps.**

KIM WHITE

This paper interprets key passages of Giorgio Agamben’s *Remnants of Auschwitz* as an esoteric appendix to Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History.” It advances this reading against two sets of criticisms of Agamben’s theorization of Auschwitz and its significance to ethics and politics today. The first set asserts that Agamben’s focus on the *Muselmänner* omits forms of active opposition to Nazi thanatopolitics. This, it’s suggested, obscures the complexity of political contestation in the camps (Mesnard) and reduces the ontology of resistance to a perversely sterile biopolitics (Negri). The second set of criticisms attacks Agamben’s accounts of relationality in the spheres of subjectivity and history. For Mills, Agambenian subjectivity is so insular as to be incapable of grounding a communal ethics; for Leys, Agamben’s account of the mutual interaction between distinct historical temporalities reifies subjectivity in order to grant it passage beyond the borders of life and death, past and present.

According to Benjamin’s 4th thesis, a proletarian fight for the necessities of life engenders ‘spiritual things’—affects and discourses constitutive of ethical relations with others—inmanent to the struggle for acquisition and redistribution of material goods. It is this inextricable entwinement of egalitarian materialism with phenomenologies of communality that constitutes the evanescent testimony figured in the 5th thesis that the 6th thesis enjoins us to bring to bear on the present. But at Auschwitz, the imposition of a starvation labour regime means that proletarian struggle becomes impossible, and, so too, on Benjamin’s account, the ethical relationality co-extensive to such struggle. It is for this reason that Agamben turns to the seemingly negative figure of the Muselmann and a phenomenology of shame in order to map this terra incognita of ethics unanticipated by Benjamin and found a
new fundamental political subjectivity to which communist biopolitics must reorient itself.

**Reinstalling the Real: Laruelle, Brassier, Meillassoux**  
**EMMA WILSON**

In the concluding paragraph of *What is Philosophy?* (1994), Deleuze and Guattari assert that, “Philosophy needs a non-philosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs a non-art and science needs a non-science” (1994, p. 218). Affixed to this assertion is a footnote remarking upon Francois Laruelle's nonphilosophy: “Laruelle proposes a comprehension of nonphilosophy as the 'real of science,' beyond the object of knowledge...but,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “we do not see why this real of science is not non-science as well” (p. 234). The following paper will examine the “reinstallation of the real” undertaken by Francois Laruelle, and more recently, by Ray Brassier and Quentin Meillassoux. For these theorists, the real is conceived of as aphilosophical, yet scientifically or mathematically apprehendable. In the following, I will attempt to address Deleuze and Guattari’s query as to why the “real of science” constitutes, for Laruelle (and others), the nonphilosophical real, and the implications of this for philosophy.

**Beyond Restitution: Radical Dispossession and Object-Mediated Relations of Loss in the work of Judith Butler and Saskia Sassen**  
**MAGDALENA ZOLKOS**

In the last two decades, humanitarian restitution has become the key reparative mechanism for addressing and rectifying dispossession and population displacement during violent conflict. The critique of restitution emphasizes that it is often ill-matched for those countries where landownership rules differ from the Western property norms. Also, because restitution is a mechanism of corrective justice fixed on the return to possessory status quo, it has been critiqued as an insufficient response to the structural problems underpinning mass expropriation, such as unequal distribution of land or insecure land access. What has not been sufficiently discussed, however, is that the restitutive discourse becomes operative through the work of the international humanitarian regime—to securitize and urge a response to certain acts of dispossession is to marginalize or to render invisible those forms of dispossession and vulnerability that do not conform with the legal definition of expropriation (i.e. the seizing of privately owned property by the state during armed conflict), but designate other kinds of loss and disenfranchisement, or what Judith Butler in her recent work analyzes as “performative dispossession,” and Saskia Sassen as “expulsion.” This paper offers a reading of Sassen’s ideas about the
systemic logic of expulsion that defines subjective vulnerability in late-capitalism in terms of the spatio-temporal dislocation, and of Butler’s notion of dispossession as a loss of belonging in the world, which one can resist collectively, corporeally and performatively. This paper follows Sassen’s and Butler’s logic of the late capitalist disposessive effects (rather than oppressive effects) on the formation of vulnerable subjects. It then argues for an idea of object-mediated relations of loss so as to explore the affective dimensions of the practices and politics of response to dispossession and so as to shift, or unsettle, the anthropocentric assumptions underpinning the restitutive discourse.
BOOK PANEL: BEN GOLDER, FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS
JESSICA WHYTE, PAUL PATTON, COLIN KOOPMAN, and BEN GOLDER

This book focuses on Michel Foucault’s late work on rights in order to address broader questions about the politics of rights in the contemporary era. As several commentators have observed, something quite remarkable happens in this late work. In his early career, Foucault had been a great critic of the liberal discourse of rights. Suddenly, from about 1976 onward, he makes increasing appeals to rights in his philosophical writings, political statements, interviews, and journalism. He not only defends their importance; he argues for rights new and as-yet-unrecognized. Does Foucault simply revise his former positions and endorse a liberal politics of rights? Ben Golder proposes an answer to this puzzle, which is that Foucault approaches rights in a spirit of creative and critical appropriation. He uses rights strategically for a range of political purposes that cannot be reduced to a simple endorsement of political liberalism. Golder develops this interpretation of Foucault’s work while analyzing its shortcomings and relating it to the approaches taken by a series of current thinkers also engaged in considering the place of rights in contemporary politics, including Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Jacques Rancière.

BOOK PANEL: JENNIFER MENSCH, KANT’S ORGANICISM: EPIGENESIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
MICHAEL OLSON, DALIA NASSAR, and DIEGO BUBBIO

Because it laid the foundation for nearly all subsequent epistemologies, Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* has overshadowed his other interests in natural history and the life sciences, which scholars have long considered as separate from his rigorous theoretical philosophy—until now. In *Kant’s Organicism*, Jennifer Mensch draws a crucial link between these spheres by showing how the concept of epigenesis—a radical theory of biological formation—lies at the heart of Kant’s conception of reason.

As Mensch argues, epigenesis was not simply a metaphor for Kant but centrally guided his critical philosophy, especially the relationship between reason and the categories of the understanding. Offsetting a study of Kant’s highly technical theory of cognition with a mixture of intellectual history and biography, she situates the epigenesis of reason within broader investigations into theories of generation, genealogy, and classification, and against later writers and thinkers such as Goethe and Darwin. Distilling vast amounts of research on the scientific literature of the time into a concise and readable book, Mensch offers one of the most refreshing
looks not only at Kant’s famous first *Critique* but at the history of philosophy and the life sciences as well.

**BOOK PANEL: JON ROFFE, ABSTRACT MARKET THEORY**
GREGORY FLAXMAN, JOE HUGHES, HENRY SOMERS-HALL and MIGUEL VATTER

The market plays a profoundly significant role in contemporary society; its operations and effects engage the whole range of human existence from the global to the mundane. At the same time, answers to the question ‘what is the market?’ are rudimentary at best; the disparity between theory and reality was cast in a particularly stark light by the global financial crisis.

Drawing on a variety of sources in recent and contemporary philosophy, finance, the history of modern mathematics, sociology and anthropology, *Abstract Market Theory* elaborates a new philosophy of the market, and thereby provides a means to philosophically engage with questions concerning value, price, capitalism and debt.

**CAN THERE BE LAW WITHOUT VIOLENCE?**

The law is the basis of institutions such as sovereignty and the police, which are designed to protect citizens from violence and to establish order, peace and stability. At the same time, these institutions need to use violent means to extend their protection. Is it possible to establish clear limits to how the law can use violence? Or is the violence from which the law is meant to protect us internal to the law itself? These questions are exacerbated in the age of biopolitics. If biopolitics signals the prevalence of processes of regulation and normalization over the law, then does this mean an intensification of violence?

**Biopolitics and the Tree of Life: Arendt on Law and Violence**
PEG BIRMINGHAM

In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that violence has no contrary; it is tied to the essence of life and will to power. If true, then in the Nietzschean framework, violence cannot be eradicated from the law no more than it could be eradicated from life or the will to power. Hannah Arendt, by contrast, argues that violence has a contrary, namely, power. For her this allows us to think a notion of law without violence, one tied to life and life affirming power rather than one bound up with death and destruction. In this context, she thinks the Roman notion of law as ius gentium, the law as generative allowing for the emergence of new political worlds not rooted in the violence of an exclusion/inclusion relation. How successful is Arendt in tying her conception of law to the tree of life and how might this allow for a conception
of biopolitics rooted in the affirmative power of the living rather than tied to death and destruction? At the same, what dangers lurk in an Arendtian notion of the law that attempts to free itself from violence?

**Betrayed by the Messiah: Nietzsche’s anti-theological theology and the emergence of the anarchic subject**  
**JAMES MARTEL**

In this paper I will argue that over the course of the book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche subjects us to a series of temptations whereby he draws out our desire to be redeemed, to be better than ourselves (hence negating the actual person that we are). In each iteration, he follows this temptation by exposing it as false and empty, leaving us bereft and left to our own devices. This cycle of temptation and disappointment has a complex messianic dimension for Nietzsche; in a sense, he is redeeming us from redemption, supplying a messiah who saves us from messianism. Rather than make us dependent on messiahs to give us our identity, Nietzsche’s repeated moves serve to throw us onto our own devices. What emerges after the collapse of our false, interpellated identities is a far more complex, overlapping, multiple and internally divided set of persona. Rather than cohering as a “true” identity, we find instead in Nietzsche an anarchic mix of identities and interests. Giving voice to our anarchic subjectivity, Nietzsche supplies both an understanding of ourselves as such as well as the means by which that identity can be realized (if not once and for all, then at least momentarily and in fragments).

**Spinoza on Law and Violence: On Miscomprehension**  
**DIMITRIS VARDOUNAKIS**

In Chapter 4 of the *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza defines law in terms of its utility. At the same time, the logic of violence is also instrumental, as Hannah Arendt for instance insists. This raises the question about the relation between law and violence in Spinoza’s philosophy. It is easy to deal with this question as far as it concerns human law or what Chapter 4 also refers to *jus*. However, it is much more problematic to deal with this question when it comes to divine law, or in the absolute sense. How can Spinoza’s god, famous for being impersonal and non-intervening, be understood either in instrumental terms or in partaking of violence? To answer this problematic, I argue, Spinoza develops an intriguing theory of miscomprehension.
EQUITY AND DIVERSITY SESSION
CONVENE BY MARGUERITE LA CAZE and ROSS BARNHAM

The ASCP aims to support and promote equity and diversity both in the Society and in philosophy more broadly. Each year a dedicated session on equity and diversity will be held at the conference. This year’s dedicated panel will focus on the theme of increasing diversity at academic conferences and events, and other issues participants wish to raise. Panellists include Amy Allen, Marilyn Standera, and Marguerite La Caze.

FRENCH PHENOMENOLOGY AVANT LA LETTRE? DIDEROT’S LETTER ON THE BLIND
GEOFF BOUCHER, MARTYN LLOYD, and MATTHEW SHARPE

It is remarkable that, notwithstanding significant conceptual and thematic continuities, French Phenomenology from the mid- to late-twentieth century was not significantly influenced by its eighteenth-century predecessors. Rather it was influenced predominantly by trends in the Continental ‘rationalist’ tradition and in German idealism. This was in large part because of the success of the Dialectic of Enlightenment hypothesis which was popularised by Adorno and Horkheimer but was initially and most powerfully formulated by Hegel. This hypothesis was an indictment of major moments of the German Enlightenment—particularly Kant—but was also an occlusion of much of the best and most interesting theory of the French Enlightenment—particularly the philosophy of the philosophes.

This panel will focus on one of the French Enlightenment’s most brilliant texts by one of the most significant of the philosophes: Denis Diderot’s “Letter on the Blind for the use of Those Who See” (1749). One of the most intriguing and powerful texts of the period, it is a young Diderot’s reflections on many of the Enlightenment’s most significant intellectual, theological, and medical concepts. A sustained meditation on corporeality and sensation and on the relationship between sensing and knowing, in the text sight, illumination, and Enlightenment are variously and ambiguously used to refer both to bodily sense and as the most privileged metaphors for knowledge. Complex, ironic, sceptical, and paradoxical, like much of Diderot’s oeuvre the text is richly polyvocal, a complex blend of fiction and fact, philosophy and literature, playfulness and heterodox radicalism, the “Letter” is tightly imbricated with the period’s literary culture. The papers in this panel will use Diderot’s “Letter” to reconstruct and retrieve a major moment of Enlightenment philosophy, one which is in fact highly critical of theories of absolute subjectivity or of autonomous reason.
The concept of 'scene' is as crucial to the history of philosophy as it is to dramatic theatre. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the term—which derives from the ancient Greek for 'tent' or 'booth,' itself possibly a derivation of the word for 'shadow'—functions as a ground-term for philosophy from at least Plato on. Why? Because the dramatic structure of Platonic dialogue is at once a re-uptake of and a violent separation from the structure of ancient theatre. Yet the term remains enigmatic in philosophical (as well as in theatrical, art, cinema and literary) history, not least due to its metastatic ubiquity: at once a material place, a stage, it can also designate the action or sequence of actions, special effects, the painted scenery, the entirety of a performance, or a fragment, a remnant, a milieu, an event, or an expression of intense affect. This panel proposes to discuss certain contemporary philosophical and psychoanalytic thematizations and redeployments of 'scene,' in thinkers such as Lacan, Derrida and Deleuze, as they come to at once repeat and displace 'the scene of philosophy.'

PLENARY PANEL: THE WORK OF MAX DEUTSCHER
PAUL CRITTENDEN, MICHELLE BOULOUS-WALKER and MAX DEUTSCHER

Paul Crittenden will speak on the major themes and the distinctive style of philosophising that emerged in Max Deutscher’s book Subjecting and Objecting: An Essay in Objectivity (1982). This was a contribution to moral thought as much as philosophy of knowledge on topics that have remained important in Max’s work to the present day. Descartes and Berkeley are key voices in the conversation, but many others, including Husserl, Heidegger, Ryle, Sartre, and J.J.C. Smart, have a word to say in passing. Husserl’s contribution calls for particular attention. Michelle Boulous-Walker will address Max’s work on judgment, and perhaps also his legacy for feminist philosophy in Australasia.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLANTS

Vegetable Genius: Vocabularies of Life from Rousseau to Goethe
JENNIFER MENSCH

From nature shows to popular press releases, the latest scientific findings regarding “plant intelligence” have begun to appear in recent years, with critics pointing out the misnomer for non-neuronal beings, and supporters searching for new words to describe processes that in other creatures would readily be called decision making, communication, and cooperation. Indeed,
it now seems that human exceptionalism is in for further disappointment with research showing the expansive possibilities for non-neuronal networks when it comes to processing information. Eco-critic Michael Marder has followed suit, arguing that plants are not only objects of ethical concern, but indeed vulnerable beings who should be protected under the same rubric for the universal protection of human rights. Reading Rousseau and Goethe together, we discern early precursors to today’s notions of “networked intelligence” and “distributed identity,” and gain heightened respect for the organism’s resistance to scientific determination.

Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Plants
VANESSA LEMM

The objective of this paper is to present an account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of plants by providing an overview of his textual references to the world of plants. Such an overview suggests that, in contrast to naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche, the examples of the life of plants found in Nietzsche’s texts, reveal the secret of human freedom and creativity. What we can learn from plants is not how and in what way we are determined by our cultural and biological inheritance and environment but, on the contrary, how and in what way we can be free and creative as plants and become the future value creators Nietzsche envisages.

THE PROBLEM OF LAW IN CAPITALISM: FROM MARX TO NEOLIBERALISM
JESSICA WHYTE, MIGUEL VATTER and CHARLES BARBOUR

Neoliberalism is a political doctrine that calls for less intervention by the state in the economic and legal systems. However, in the current debate on neoliberalism it is a disputed question whether the motor behind this "state-phobia" (Foucault) is economic or legal. Furthermore, there is confusion as to the kind of relation between law and economy proposed by neoliberal doctrines as well as in the literature dedicated to the critique of neoliberalism, generally based on Marx’s critique of political economy and its juridical form of subjective rights. In this panel we approach this question from three different perspectives and problem areas: the role played by the “politics of human rights” in the establishment of neoliberalism (especially in relation to Hayek); the legal presuppositions of the idea of human capital (in relation to Becker); and with regard to how Marx understood the relation between legal forms and capital.
THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY

The Limits of Contextual Determination
MICHAEL OLSON

Historians of philosophy devote considerable energy to unearthing ways in which networks of intellectual, cultural, and political influences bind ideas to their historical contexts. The profits of this approach lead some to argue for an extreme contextualism for which communication between intellectual contexts is always miscommunication. Taking Ursula Goldenbaum’s recent analysis of Kant’s “Enlightenment” essay as exemplary of contextually sensitive historical analysis, this paper argues that contextualist historiography provides its own means for limiting the claim that ideas are inescapably bound to the contexts of their articulation.

Truth and Method revisited
KNOX PEDEN

Nowadays more cited than read, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s *Truth and Method* remains a provocation to historians of philosophy and intellectual historians. By placing interpretation in a field circumscribed by aesthetic experience, the book renders problematic any attempt at historical judgment that would seek to take leave of aesthetic criteria in favor of a putatively epistemic evaluative stance. This paper will assess Gadamer’s intervention in light of various resurgent and competing contemporary rationalisms.

Problematising the philosophical discourse of modernity
JEAN-PHILIPPE DERANTY

In the contemporary landscape, arguments in normative philosophy tend to operate on the basis of more or less implicit assumptions about “pre-modern” societies and how different these were from “our” own, “modern” societies. This forms an unquestioned historicist premise that straddles traditions and areas of specialisation. I raise a few skeptical questions about this modernist, historicist background. I draw on Foucault’s recently published 1971 lectures to problematise the reference to his work as a definitive methodological vindication of historicism. To problematise the role of modernist arguments at the normative level, I confront some of Honneth’s major historical claims in *Freedom’s Right*, to evidence from historiography that tends to demonstrate much longer historical trends in relation to key areas of “social freedom”.

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This session we will hear from three who have taken the Philosophy PhDs in diverse directions. Dr Denise Thwaites is an Associate Director at Roslyn Oxley9 Gallery, after having completed a doctoral thesis by cotutelle at UNSW and Université Paris 8, on aesthetic and political philosophy. Dr Melissa McMahon was awarded her PhD from University of Sydney, and now works in publishing as a translator. And Dr Craig Lundy, another UNSW graduate, is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Transformation Research, University of Wollongong. Each will talk about their paths, opportunities, and obstacles. There may also be time for a more general discussion about career preparation, and the panel will be chaired by Jack Reynolds and Joanne Faulkner.