5th East West Philosopher's Forum
15-17 May 2019
School of Humanities and Languages

Venue: LAW 101 Map Ref. F8, UNSW Kensington Campus

**Extended cognition East and West:
how re-thinking cognition helps enlarge epistemology**

Conference Program

Wednesday 15 May 2019

2.00 pm	Conference Registration
2.15	Welcome
2.30 - 3.45	Richard Menary (Macquarie University)
	Epistemic Tracking Tools and Cognitive Character
3.45-4.15	Tea
4.15 – 5.15	Paper 1 Seisuke Hayakawa (University of Tokyo)
	Empathy as Shared Epistemic Responsibility in the Context of Illness
5.15 – 6.15	Paper 2 Shane Ryan (Nazarbayev University)
	Wise Environments

Thursday 16 May 2019

9.15 am – 10.15   Paper 3 Stephen Hetherington (University of New South Wales)
Knowing-to

10.15 – 10.45   Tea

10.45 – 11.45   Paper 4 Leo Cheung (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
The possibility of the extended knower

12.00 – 1.00   Paper 5 David Bronstein (Georgetown University/University of New South Wales)
Aristotle's Virtue Epistemology

1.00   Lunch

2.00 – 3.15   Keynote speech Richard Menary
Cognitive Integration: How Culture Transforms Us and Extends Our Cognitive Capabilities

3.30 – 4.00   Tea

4.00 – 5.00   Paper 6 Masaharu Mizumoto (Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)
Cross-Linguistic Disagreement in Philosophy

5.00 – 5.45   Roundtable discussion
Conference dinner

Friday 17 May 2019

9.30 am – 10.30   Paper 7 Markos Valaris (University of New South Wales)
Agential Control and Knowledge in Action

10.30 – 11.00   Tea

11.00 – 12.00   Paper 8 Michael Mi (Soochow University)
The Problem of Forgetting

12.00   Lunch

1.00 – 2.00   Paper 9 Karyn Lai (University of New South Wales)
Knowing with chisels and sticks: reflections from the Zhuangzi

2.00 – 2.45   Roundtable discussion and closing

David Bronstein (Georgetown/UNSW)
Aristotle's Virtue Epistemology

Contemporary virtue epistemologists such as John Greco and Ernest Sosa argue that cognitive acts have certain normative properties because of the capacities from which they issue: a cognitive act is knowledge because it issues from a capacity that constitutes an intellectual virtue. I argue that Aristotle is not a virtue epistemologist in the contemporary sense. For he reverses the direction of analysis common in contemporary virtue theories: a capacity constitutes an intellectual virtue because it issues in cognitive acts that are knowledge. Whether a cognitive act is knowledge, for Aristotle, is not determined by the agent's inner capacities but by the nature of the objects with which she is in a cognitive relation and by the nature of that relation. Aristotle's 'act-based' virtue epistemology is a compelling alternative to current 'agent-based' views.

Leo Cheung (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
The Possibility of the Extended Knower

In their influential paper "The extended mind" (1998), Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue for the possibility of the extended mind. Based on Clark and Chalmers' views concerning the extended mind, Stephen Hetherington argues in his paper "The extended knower" (2012) that there are extended knowers, provided epistemic externalism holds. This paper aims to show that Hetherington's notion of the extended knower is problematic. The main argument is that the conceptual intelligibility of his notion of the extended knower entails the highly counterintuitive consequence that, in some cases, some negative external environmental features would have to be constitutive of the extended knower.

Seisuke Hayakawa (Tokyo)
Empathy as Shared Epistemic Responsibility in the Context of Illness

Empathy can, undoubtedly, play a crucial role in understanding how patients undergo illness. The role of empathy, however, is not always positive. Indeed, it has a dark side. Empathy can become problematic and even produce "irresponsible ignorance" towards the suffering experienced by persons with serious illnesses. This occurs when our empathic tendency is profoundly affected by the socially dominant norm of restitution, namely, the norm that places overriding weight on restorability, resilience, and controllability (Frank 1995). Notably, excessive empathy towards restitution narratives may marginalize and exclude the chaos narratives of deeply suffering people, thereby causing what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls "epistemic injustice". Epistemic injustice, in the context of illness, centrally involves ignoring the fundamental significance of patients' testimonies about the lived experiences of suffering, thus undermining patients' sense of self-respect and agency (Carel and Kidd 2014). In this respect, empathy can also have dehumanizing effects. Such an observation inevitably leads us to ask how empathy could/should function in order to rectify epistemic injustice in healthcare. I shall address this critical question, arguing how epistemically responsible empathy has to incorporate a *shared* form of epistemic responsibility that can resist epistemic injustice vis-à-vis illness.

Stephen Hetherington (UNSW)
Knowing-To

Increasingly, epistemologists are discussing the conceptual relationships between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. This paper argues that epistemology should also encompass a distinct concept of knowing-to. Only with knowing-to can knowledge-how be manifested in a particular action within a particular setting. Unlike the possibly enduring knowledge-how, knowing-to is fleeting and contextual. It is inherent within what Ryle called intelligent acting. In ordinary parlance, we talk freely of knowing-to; here, I begin investigating this epistemic aspect of action.

Karyn Lai (UNSW)
Knowing with chisels and sticks: reflections from the Zhuangzi

The *Zhuangzi*, a 4th century BCE Daoist text, has quite a few stories that centre on performance: a bellstand maker who selects wood to create wonderful bellstands; a ferryman who steers through rough waters; a cicada-catcher who uses a stick, as if it were his hand, to catch cicadas; and a wheelmaker who, in using his chisel, feels it in his hand and responds with his heart. What is the role of the stick, for the cicada-catcher, and the chisel, for the wheelmaker? I use the performance orientation of these stories to raise some questions about knowledge and action.

Richard Menary (Macquarie University)
Epistemic Tracking Tools and Cognitive Character

In Keeping Track With Things (Menary 2018) I argued for an account of extended epistemic character based in an account of the cultural evolution of epistemic tracking tools. In this talk I update that argument and focus on the cultural inheritance of extended epistemic traits. In doing so I respond both to Pritchard's weak anti-individualism and Levy and Alfano's recent call for a deeply social extended epistemology.

Richard Menary (Macquarie University)
Cognitive Integration: How Culture Transforms Us and Extends Our Cognitive Capabilities

Cognitive integration is a contribution to the embodied, embedded, and extended cognition movement in philosophy and cognitive science and the extended synthesis movement in evolutionary biology—particularly cultural evolution and niche construction. In this talk I will outline the framework in terms of its core commitments, provide motivations for these core commitments, and discuss core examples of CI at work. I shall also respond to several recent criticisms of the CI framework.

Chienkuo Mi (Soochow University, Taipei)
The Problem of Forgetting

Memory is commonly viewed as the "store-house" of our past knowledge, experiences, or information. However, it will lead naturally to the following questions and puzzles: where do we store (retain) our memory? how do we store our memory? what does it mean to say that we remember something in the past? and how can we be sure that our memory is reliable, justifiable, or competent enough? On the other hand, forgetting is usually regarded as the loss of memory or inability to recall past information. It appears to be the case that "memory" and "forgetting" are always opposite to each other, especially for the western philosophers or epistemologists, and that "memory" plays a default and vital role in general while "forgetting" a deficient and unwanted one.

Recent researches in psychology and philosophy (East and West) have shown or argued that forgetting is sometimes necessary for our psychological and cognitive wellness, and that forgetting can be virtuous as an ethical or epistemic factor. If it is true, then "forgetting" will post a threat and a challenge to the main theories in contemporary epistemology. It is argued that in order to deal with the challenge and solve the problem (of forgetting), an intellectual (or moral) agent has to learn and develop a well-balanced competence (or character-trait) of "memorising/remembering" and "forgetting".

Masaharu Mizumoto (Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)
Cross-Linguistic Disagreement in Philosophy

There seems a significant semantic difference between the English knowledge verb and the Japanese knowledge verb(s) (Mizumoto 2018). But if so, it is possible that speakers of one language attribute knowledge to an agent in one context while speakers of another language deny knowledge to the same agent in the same context, with their respective knowledge verbs. Let us call this situation *cross-linguistic disagreement*. Such a disagreement is, of course, not limited to knowledge verbs, but potentially found for expressions of almost any topic in philosophy. But if a cross-linguistic disagreement is genuine, it should be a *faultless disagreement* (with neither party of the two linguistic communities committing errors). I will discuss its consequences for philosophy and possible responses, through 1) comparing it with the case of intra-linguistic (faultless) disagreement and 2) considering the (dis)analogy with the disagreement over what to call water.

Shane Ryan (Nazarbayev)
Wise Environments

This paper is concerned with how environments can be designed so as to promote the attainment of wisdom. The work draws on the wisdom literature as well as literature on how environments, physical and social, may be significant for epistemic attainment. Referencing the wisdom literature, the case is made that wisdom requires understanding how to live well in specific circumstances. Next I provide an overview of epistemic environmentalism, according to which, ceteris paribus, we should alter our epistemic environments in order to promote epistemic attainment. I argue that if we aim to promote epistemic attainment of wisdom, then we should make changes to social and physical environments so as to promote understanding of how to live well. Of course, what it is to live well is highly contentious, particularly in pluralistic societies. The paper doesn't advocate promoting a particular conception of the good life but rather the means by which we can understand how to live well. This involves promoting intellectual virtue, as well as the practices and experiences from which we can learn about living well.

Markos Valaris (UNSW)
Agential Control and Knowledge in Action

There is a close connection between agency and a certain kind of control: no event could be an intentional action of yours unless you have some degree of control over its unfolding. And there also seems to be a close connection between agency and knowledge: at least typically, agents have a distinctive kind of knowledge of the things that they intentionally do. But what is the relation between these two conditions on action? It seems implausible that they should be simply independent of each other. In this talk, I suggest an account of how they relate. On the account I suggest, we should think of agential control as a kind of embodied practical knowledge. As we intuitively say, an agent who acts with control is an agent who 'knows what she's doing'.